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INTRODUCTION 
Fashion designers in the United States, unlike those in many for-
eign jurisdictions, enjoy only limited intellectual property protection 
for their creative endeavors.  The American patent, copyright, and 
trademark systems each present obstacles to obtaining protection for 
fashion designs.  Copyright and trademark law protect certain elements 
of fashion designs, such as unique fabrics and logos, but the protec-
tions do not extend to the general shape and appearance of a fashion 
design.  Moreover, copyright and trademark law do not grant protec-
tion to products and features that serve a utilitarian purpose.  On the 
other hand, patent law presents difficult statutory barriers; a design 
must be novel and nonobvious, and can only gain protection after a 
lengthy litigation process.  The result is a gap in intellectual property 
protection that leaves fashion designers vulnerable to a stitch-by-stitch, 
seam-by-seam replication of the designs they labor to create.          
While the duplication of fashion designs is not a new phenome-
non, the practice has recently received increased attention due to 
high-profile lawsuits by famous designers including Anna Sui and 
Diane von Furstenberg against low-end, mass retailers such as Forever 
21.  The defendants in these cases are known as “fast-fashion” firms for 
their ability to replicate original designs at alarming speed, on a large 
scale, and at low cost.1  Many fashion designers disapprove, claiming 
 
1 See C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1170-71 (2009). 
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that fast-fashion firms’ capabilities of quickly copying original designs 
and bringing those copies to market deprive original designers of prof-
its and stifle design firm creativity.  The fashion industry, represented 
by the industry group Council of Fashion Designers of America 
(CFDA), has sought Congress’s assistance to rectify the longstanding 
dearth of intellectual property protection for fashion designs.2  The 
Senate introduced a proposal to amend the copyright statute known as 
the Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act (IDPPPA) 
last session,3 and the House of Representatives recently introduced the 
same proposal.4     
In this Comment, I address the normative question of the optimal 
scope of intellectual property protection for fashion designs through 
game theory’s unique perspective of law and economics.  I do so by 
developing a game theoretic model that evaluates the impact of great-
er legal protection on the incentives of fashion designers to bring law-
suits to protect their designs and of fast-fashion firms to make replicas 
of these designs.  Analyzing the incentives at play will allow me to pre-
dict whether the IDPPPA in its current form will deter fast-fashion 
firms from replicating designs, encourage innovation, and maximize 
welfare in the fashion industry.   
Part I of this Comment offers a detailed overview of the current 
state of intellectual property protection for fashion designs in the 
United States and compares U.S. protection with the legal regimes of 
foreign jurisdictions.  Part II discusses the recent developments in the 
fashion industry that have triggered an outcry against copying and 
 
2 Arguing in support of the Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention 
Act (IDPPPA), the CFDA asserted that “[p]iracy can wipe out young careers in a single 
season” and that “[w]ithout this legislation, the creativity and innovation that has put 
American fashion in a leadership position will dry up.”  Innovative Design Protection and 
Piracy Prevention Act:  Hearing on H.R. 2511 Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Compe-
tition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 7, 9 (2011) 
[hearinafter IDPPPA Hearing] (statement of Lazaro Hernandez, Designer & Cofounder, 
Proenza Schouler). 
3 S. 3728, 111th Cong. (2010).  This bill unanimously passed the Senate Committee 
of the Judiciary before the congressional session ended in December 2010.  See BRIAN  
T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22685, COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR FASHION DE-
SIGN:  A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 1, 3 (2011) (providing a legislative 
history of S. 3728). 
4 H.R. 2511, 112th Cong. (2011).  As of January 2012, the most recent action taken 
for the house bill was its introduction and referral to the Committee on the Judiciary 
for a hearing before the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the 
Internet on July 15, 2011.  For detailed tracking information on this bill, see 2011 Bill 
Tracking H.R. 2511, 112th Cong. (LEXIS).  See infra Section I.B. for a detailed analysis 
of the provisions of this legislation.   
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summarizes the scholarly views on the normative question of which 
legal regime, if any, should exist for the protection of fashion designs.  
Part III provides background on the law and economics approach to 
intellectual property protection and explains the relevance of game 
theory, a law and economics tool, to the analysis of copying fashion 
designs.  Part IV lays out the assumptions and the structure of a game 
theoretic model and applies this model to different legal regimes 
aimed at protecting fashion designs.  Finally, Part V examines the find-
ings of the game theory analysis in Part IV, evaluates the efficacy of the 
Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act as a policy 
choice, and introduces possible alternatives.   
I.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION FOR FASHION DESIGNS 
A.  Current Protections for Fashion Designs 
American law offers what has been described as a “patchwork of 
protection” for fashion designs.5  That is, American intellectual prop-
erty laws provide neither a specific nor a comprehensive scheme of 
protection for fashion designs.  Instead, fashion designers must seek 
protection from the existing institutions of trademark, patent, and 
copyright law for relief from copying.  However, each of these sources 
of law presents obstacles to a plaintiff fashion designer.    
1.  Trademark 
Trademark law protects “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof . . . used by a person . . . to identify and distin-
guish his or her goods . . . .”6  Trademark can thus protect certain ele-
ments of a fashion design, such as a designer’s logo.  However, 
trademark protection does not extend to the entire fashion design.  
For a fashion designer to gain protection for the entire design, he may 
have to turn to trade dress, an extension of trademark that the United 
States Code does not explicitly define.  The Supreme Court has recog-
nized trade dress: 
 The breadth of the definition of marks registrable under § 2 [of the 
Lanham Act] . . . has been held to embrace not just word marks . . . and 
 
5 See Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Fashion Design (describing the interplay 
of different forms of intellectual property protection for fashion designers), in 1 IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 115, 121 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007).   
6 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).  The Lanham Act, which is codified in title 15 of the 
United States Code, governs trademark law.  Id. §§ 1051–1127. 
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symbol marks . . . but also “trade dress”—a category that originally included 
only the packaging, or “dressing,” of a product, but in recent years has been 
expanded by many Courts of Appeals to encompass the design of a product.
7
 
With this broader definition of trademark, fashion designers can 
try to register their designs as trade dress, but they will have to demon-
strate distinctiveness, which is an “explicit prerequisite for registration 
of trade dress.”8  Designers may establish distinctiveness of a trademark 
or a trade dress in one of two ways:  a mark can either be inherently 
distinctive, or it can gain secondary meaning.9  A trademark or trade 
dress is inherently distinctive if its “intrinsic nature serves to identify a 
particular source.”10  A mark gains secondary meaning when “in the 
minds of the public, [its] primary significance . . . is to identify the 
source of the product rather than the product itself.”11   
In practice, “[t]he more easily visible the logo is,” the more protec-
tion there will be afforded for a design.12  While an exact copy of a 
handbag design with prominent identifiers—such as a Louis Vuitton 
bag—presents a case for trademark infringement, a uniquely tailored 
item of clothing without such identifiers does not.  A fashion designer 
therefore would have to protect an item without logos and identifiers 
by trying to protect the entire design through trade dress.  This is a tall 
task, as it is not easy to prove inherent distinctiveness and secondary 
meaning, especially for a fashion designer with limited resources.  
More importantly, the functionality doctrine poses an enormous hur-
dle in that it denies trademark protection to any “useful product fea-
ture.”13  The shape and form of an article of clothing are generally 
considered essential to use or purpose and thus fall outside the scope 
of trademark protection.14  The fear is that if a trademark protects use-
 
7 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000).    
8 Id. at 210. 
9 See id. at 210-11.   
10 Id. at 210 (quoting Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992)).   
11 Id. at 211 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 
n.11 (1982)).   
12 See Scafidi, supra note 5, at 121 (suggesting that legal concerns incentivize de-
signers to incorporate logos into their designs and make those logos as conspicuous as 
possible); see also Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox:  Innovation 
and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1701-02 (2006) (arguing 
that copyright provides little protection overall because “[f]or the vast majority of ap-
parel goods . . . the trademarks are either inside the garment or subtly displayed on 
small portions such as buttons”).   
13 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995).  
14 See Lisa J. Hedrick, Note, Tearing Fashion Design Protection Apart at the Seams, 65 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 215, 227 (2008) (noting that “trademark cracks the door to protec-
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ful elements of a product, “a monopoly over such features could be 
obtained without regard to whether they qualify as patents and could 
be extended forever (because trademarks may be renewed in perpetu-
ity).”15  Given these obstacles, most fashion designers are unlikely to 
receive significant protection from trademark.   
2.  Patent 
Utility and design patents theoretically are available to fashion de-
signs as a form of intellectual property protection.  A utility patent can 
be obtained by “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof.”16  In addition to this subject matter 
requirement, an invention must be truly novel17 and nonobvious18 to 
qualify for patent protection.  The nonobviousness requirement pre-
sents a roadblock to fashion designers because an eligible design must 
be so original that another fashion designer, or someone similarly en-
gaged in the fashion industry, would not have thought of it.19  Given 
the relatively standard shape and form of articles of clothing and the 
industry practice to “quote, comment upon, and refer to prior work,” 
designers cannot easily, if at all, show nonobviousness.20  A fashion de-
signer may also consider applying for a design patent, which is provid-
ed to “[w]hoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for 
an article of manufacture.”21  While this language seems sufficiently 
broad to encompass fashion designs, the novelty and nonobviousness 
requirements still apply.22  
Even if a fashion designer can meet the statutory requirements, 
the patent system presents a further obstacle to protecting fashion de-
signs:  timing.  The patent system takes too long to grant protection.23  
In 2010, the average time for an initial determination of patentability 
 
tion for fashion designs,” but that “[c]ourts categorically treat clothing as functional, 
thereby precluding trademark”).  
15 Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 165 (citations omitted).   
16 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).   
17 See id. § 102.   
18 See id. § 103(a). 
19 See id.   
20 Hemphill & Suk, supra note 1, at 1160.  
21 35 U.S.C. § 171.   
22 See id.     
23 See Scafidi, supra note 5, at 122 (“By the time a fashion designer could obtain 
either a utility patent or a design patent the item at issue . . . would already be passé.”).  
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was 25.7 months—an eternity in the fashion industry.24  Within one 
year a designer may release several seasons of clothing exhibiting rapid 
changes in style.  Given the short life cycle of any given fashion design, 
it is grossly impractical for a fashion designer to seek such a patent and 
then enforce it against alleged violators.  Copyright protection in con-
trast begins upon fixation in a tangible medium and does not require 
registration.25   
3.  Copyright 
Copyright would seem to apply to fashion designs because by statu-
tory definition its subject matter includes “original works of authorship 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”26  Copyright protection 
would also seem advantageous because it is easy to obtain and subsists 
from the time of creation.27  However, an article of clothing, which 
represents an original design in a fixed form, cannot receive copyright 
protection because clothing is “utilitarian” in nature.28  Copyright law 
in the United States treats nonfunctional creative works as the true 
domain of copyright.29  Some useful articles can receive copyright pro-
tection, limited to their artistic elements, but the entire article cannot 
qualify.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Mazer v. Stein extended  
copyright to a mass-produced item, a lamp, but the copyright only  
attached to the aesthetic form of the lamp and not its mechanical or 
utilitarian aspects.30  Despite its narrow scope, Mazer paved the way for 
extending copyright protection to a broader array of products, includ-
 
24 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 
FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 18 (2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ 
ar/2010/USPTOFY2010PAR.pdf. 
25 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 1:  COPYRIGHT BASICS 3 (2011), available at 
http://copyright.gov/circs/circ01.pdf (“No publication or registration or other action 
in the Copyright Office is required to secure copyright.”).  
26 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).   
27 See id. § 302(a).   
28 See Scafidi, supra note 5, at 122 (explaining that the functionality exception has 
largely excluded clothing from subject matter eligible for copyright).   
29 See id. (“The somewhat artificial distinction . . . between nonfunctional literary 
and artistic works, which are the subject matter of copyright, and useful inventions, 
which are the domain of patents, has generally excluded clothing from the subject 
matter of copyright . . . .”).  
30 See 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954) (“Unlike a patent, copyright gives no exclusive 
right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea—not the 
idea itself . . . . The copyright protects originality rather than novelty or invention.”).   
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ing fashion-related items such as artistic jewelry and dress fabrics.31  
Nevertheless, fashion designs have not yet fallen within the ambit of 
copyright.   
B.  Congressional Efforts to Extend Copyright  
Protection to Fashion Designs 
The latest effort to grant intellectual property protection to fash-
ion designs is the IDPPPA.32  The IDPPPA proposes to amend Title 17 
of the United States Code to extend a specialized form of copyright 
protection to fashion designs.   Under IDPPPA: 
A “fashion design”— 
(A) is the appearance as a whole of an article of apparel, including its 
ornamentation; and  
(B) includes original elements of the article of apparel or the original 
arrangement or placement of original or non-original elements as incor-
porated in the overall appearance of the article of apparel that— 
(i) are the result of a designer’s own creative endeavor; and  
(ii) provide a unique, distinguishable, non-trivial and non-utilitarian 
variation over prior designs for similar types of articles.
33
  
The IDPPPA provides only three years of protection,34 much less than 
the standard lifetime of copyright35 and the term of copyright available 
to other forms of design.36  Under the IDPPPA, the copyright in-
fringement standard is “substantially identical,”37 which is different 
from the “substantial similarity”38 standard prevalent in copyright law.  
 
31 See 1 MEVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08(B)(3) 
(2011) (noting that courts have protected “artistic jewelry, designs printed upon scarves 
and dress fabrics . . . ” (footnotes omitted)) .   
32 This Comment cites to provisions of House Bill 2511, which was introduced during 
the current 112th congressional session, as the “IDPPPA.”  However, Senate Bill 3728, 
which was introduced during the previous 111th congressional session, is nearly identical. 
33 IDPPPA, H.R. 2511, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(2)(B) (2011).   
34 Id. § 2(d). 
35 For works created on or after January 1, 1978, the duration of copyright is the 
author’s life plus seventy years.  17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).  
36 Vessel hulls receive copyright protection for a term of ten years.  Id. § 1305(a).  
37 H.R. 2511 § 2(e)(2).    
38 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31, § 13.03 (explaining how the legal standard 
of substantial similarity is one of “the most difficult questions in copyright law” and a 
question that concerns line drawing “[s]omewhere between the one extreme of no 
similarity and the other of complete and literal similarity”).  For a discussion of how the 
substantial similarity standard applies to the protection of fashion designs, see Victoria 
Wong FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  3/7/2012 8:24 PM 
2012 Protecting Fashion Designs 1147 
As the IDPPPA has not been enacted, there is no judicial authority on 
the interpretation of the language of “substantially identical” in the 
context of copyright.39  The IDPPPA defines the term as “an article of 
apparel which is so similar in appearance as to be likely to be mistaken 
for the protected design, and contains only those differences in con-
struction or design which are merely trivial.”40  A plain reading sug-
gests that “substantially identical” presents a higher threshold than the 
standard of “substantially similar,” as the resemblance between the 
original design and the copy has to be close to complete.   
The IDPPPA also includes a pleading standard, which would re-
quire plaintiffs to show that the protected fashion design was available 
in such a manner that the court can infer that the defendant had 
knowledge of the design.41  The current 17 U.S.C. § 1323 would govern 
remedies for infringement, entitling a plaintiff to recover either “dam-
ages adequate to compensate for infringement,”42 or the “infringer’s 
profits resulting from the sale of the copies.”43  In addition, under the 
statute, a court may also award attorneys’ fees.44 
It bears emphasis that Congress has pushed toward legislation 
providing design protection.  From 1980 to 2006, at least ten bills con-
cerning design protection were introduced in Congress.45  While many 
of these bills did not expressly address protection of fashion designs, 
they set the stage for an older incarnation of the IDPPPA, the Design 
Piracy Prohibition Act (DPPA).46  The DPPA, like the IDPPPA,  
 
Elman, Note, From the Runway to the Courtroom:  How Substantial Similarity is Unfit for Fash-
ion, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 683, 700-08 (2008). 
39 It is a widely held view that the “substantially identical” standard is a more strin-
gent standard of liability.  See, e.g., IDPPPA Hearing, supra note 2, at 15 (testimony of 
Jeannie Suk, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School) (“Deviating from the ordinary 
copyright infringement standard with a much narrower substantially identical stand-
ard for infringement, the Act allows plenty of room for designers to draw inspiration 
from others.”).      
40 H.R. 2511 § 2(a).   
41 Id. § 2(g)(2). 
42 17 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2006).  A court may increase damages up to the greater of 
$50,000 or $1 per copy.  Id. 
43 Id. § 1323(b).   
44 See id. § 1323(d). 
45 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 12, at 1756.  However, many of these general 
design bills would have exempted apparel.  Id. 
46 Introduced in 2006, House Bill 5055 was the initial proposed extension of the 
Copyright Act.  H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. (2006).  An identical bill, House Bill 2033, was 
introduced the following year.  H.R. 2033, 110th Cong. (2007).  For general background 
on and summary of the debate surrounding this legislation, see JESSICA G. JACOBS, CONG. 
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attempted to extend copyright protection to fashion designs by 
amending Title 17 of the United States Code.  However, the substance 
of the DPPA differed in a few important respects.  First, the DPPA de-
fined the term “fashion design” to include specific articles of clothing 
and accessories.47  Second, the DPPA used “substantially similar” as the 
standard for legal liability,48 which is the common standard for copy-
right infringement and likely a lower standard than the “substantially 
identical” standard found in the IDPPPA.49  Third, the DPPA lacked a 
pleading standard.50  Fourth, the DPPA suggested increasing the statu-
tory damages available for infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 1323(a) to 
the greater of $250,000 or $5 per copy—significantly more than the 
damages available under the IDPPPA.51  Like the IDPPPA, the DPPA 
provided a three-year term of protection.52  The use of the “substantial-
ly identical” standard rather than the “substantially similar” standard, 
no increase in statutory damages, and the inclusion of a pleading 
standard seem to suggest that the IDPPPA takes a softened and more 
compromising approach than the DPPA toward infringement of fash-
ion designs.53  Despite these compromises, the passage of the IDPPPA 
is anything but assured.  
C.  Foreign Approaches to Copying in the Fashion Industry 
Some scholars criticize the American intellectual property scheme 
for lagging behind other countries’ schemes in extending protection 
 
RESEARCH SERV., RS22685, COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR FASHION DESIGN:  A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE DESIGN PIRACY PROHIBITION ACT, H.R. 2033 (2007). 
47 The DPPA specified that a fashion design is “the appearance as a whole of an 
article of apparel, including its ornamentation” and listed items of apparel including 
clothing, handbags, belts, and eyeglass frames.  H.R. 2033, § 2(a).   
48 See id. § 2(a).   
49 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.   
50 Cf. IDPPPA Hearing, supra note 2, at 15 (statement of Jeannie Suk, Professor of 
Law, Harvard Law School) (stating that the IDPPPA, unlike the DPPA, contains a 
heightened pleading standard aimed at reducing frivolous litigation.)   
51 H.R. 2033, § 2(g).   
52 Id. § 2(c).   
53 The softened stance of the IDPPPA is evidenced by the position of the American 
Apparel & Footwear Association (AAFA).  The AAFA opposed the DPPA, criticizing its 
“overly broad definitions, which . . . would have opened a Pandora’s box of litigation.”  
IDPPPA Hearing, supra note 2, at 93 (statement of Kurt Courtney, Manager, Govern-
ment Relations, American Apparel & Footwear Association).  However, the AAFA has 
since expressed support for the passage of the less expansive IDPPPA.  See id. (“This 
legislation represents a targeted approach that will solve this narrow design piracy 
problem . . . .”).   
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to fashion designs.54  In fact, the gap between American and foreign 
protections for fashion designs has often been cited as a reason for the 
necessity of immediate legislative action.55  France offers the strongest 
and most explicit form of protection for designs, while England and 
the European Union provide legal protection that more closely resem-
bles the legislative proposals that have been and are currently being 
considered in Congress.  The features of these foreign approaches to 
fashion design protection will be important to keep in mind and will be 
revisited in Part V, which evaluates the IDPPPA as a legal regime.   
1.  France 
Certain countries have taken an uncompromising stance toward 
the duplication of fashion designs and have provided specific rights to 
fashion designers to protect their creations.  France arguably provides 
the most comprehensive protection and has quashed the practice of 
copying in the fashion industry by explicitly providing copyright pro-
tection to fashion.56  Long ago the Copyright Act of 1793 classified 
fashion as applied art.57  Now, French copyright law expressly provides 
protection for fashion designs.58  As is the case with copyright in the 
United States,59 no registration is required,60 and protection attaches 
upon creation.61  The term of protection is the lifetime of the author 
of the work plus “70 years thereafter.”62  Remedies for infringement of 
fashion designs include damages and “infringement seizure,” whereby 
“the courts shall be required, at the request of an author of a work 
protected . . . to seize copies constituting an unlawful reproduction of 
 
54 See infra Part II.B.3. 
55 See infra text accompanying notes 110-13. 
56 See Scafidi, supra note 5, at 117 (“While French intellectual property law has by 
no means eliminated design piracy . . . the protection enjoyed by designers working in 
Paris contributed to the strength of the industry and its global influence throughout 
the 20th century and into the 21st.”). 
57 See Olivera Medenica, Bill Would Protect Fashion Designs:  Designers Seek to Prevent 
Cheaper Knockoffs, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 28, 2006, at S1.  
58 Code de la propriété intellectuelle [Intellectual Property Code] art. L112-2 
(Fr.), translated at LEGIFRANCE, http://195.83.177.9/upl/pdf/code_35.pdf.  
59 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006). 
60 See Intellectual Property Code art. L111-2 (Fr.) (“A work shall be deemed to have 
been created, irrespective of any public disclosure, by the mere fact of realization of the 
author’s concept.”). 
61 See id. art. L111-1 (“The author of a work of the mind shall enjoy in that work, by 
the mere fact of its creation, an exclusive incorporeal property right . . . .”).  
62 Id. art. L123-1. 
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the work.”63   It bears mentioning that there is substance to these copy-
right laws and that French courts have treated violations of intellectual 
property rights in fashion designs with care.64  This rigorous approach 
to intellectual property protection for fashion designs has been credit-
ed for the strength and prominence of the French fashion industry.   
2.  United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom also provides legal protection to fashion  
designs.  Under British law, a designer can seek protection either 
through registered or unregistered design rights.65  A registered design 
right is the “total right of ownership to the appearance of a product or 
part of a product.”66  Protection is granted in the form of an exclusive 
right of use, which lasts for five years and may be extended up to a 
maximum of twenty-five years.67  To qualify for this protection, the 
design must be novel, meaning that “it must not be identical to a de-
sign which has already been made available to the public,” and it must 
possess individual character, meaning that “the overall impression that 
[the design] produces must be different from [that of] any other  
design which has been made available to the public.”68  Scholars have 
noted that fashion designers do not embrace registered design rights 
because of “the complex and unclear law and registration require-
ments.”69  Designers in the United Kingdom instead seem to prefer 
the unregistered right.70  This form of design right “is not a total right 
of design ownership” and only protects against copying; it does not 
 
63 Id. art. L332-1. 
64 In a famous case “that riveted the French fashion community,” French fashion 
designer Yves Saint Laurent successfully sued American designer Ralph Lauren for 
copying a black tuxedo dress, winning $395,090 in damages.  Amy M. Spindler, A Rul-
ing by a French Court Finds Copyright in a Design, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1994, at D4.  
65 See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 213 (Eng.) (providing un-
registered design protection); id. §269 (providing registered design protection); see also 
Erika Myers, Justice in Fashion:  Cheap Chic and the Intellectual Property Equilibrium in the 
United Kingdom and the United States, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 47, 63 (2009) (explaining the process 
for claiming unregistered and registered design rights, all of which are “stronger than the 
proposed protection in the United States”).  
66 INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, DESIGNS:  BASIC FACTS 4 (2009) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/d-basicfacts.pdf. 
67 Id.   
68 Id. at 5.   
69 Myers, supra note 65, at 63.   
70 See id. at 64 (“The unregistered design right, on the other hand, appears well 
suited to the needs of the fashion industry.”).   
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grant exclusive use to the designer.71  The unregistered design right 
grants protection for up to fifteen years.72  In addition, the design 
“must be of the shape or configuration of an item” and “must not be 
commonplace.”73   
3.  European Union 
 Beyond the jurisdiction-specific legal protection available in Eu-
rope, a designer may obtain what is known as a Community design 
right, which provides protection across all of the member states of the 
European Union.74   This design right is applicable to “the outward 
appearance of a product or part of it, resulting from the lines, con-
tours, colours, shape, texture, materials,” and ornamentation.75  A 
plain reading suggests that a fashion design qualifies for protection.  
The Community design right is available in registered and unregis-
tered forms.76  Similar to the registered and unregistered design rights 
in the United Kingdom, a registered Community design right, upon 
application and approval, grants the designer an exclusive right to use 
a design for up to twenty-five years.77  An unregistered Community de-
sign right automatically grants protection against copying for three 
years.78  Because of the Community design right’s expansive definition 
and geographic breadth, it is an attractive candidate for affording pro-
tection to fashion designs.   
That being said, the Community design right has existed for less 
than a decade, and there is still much debate about its effectiveness.  
Scholars believe that regulation in the European Union is underuti-
lized, citing the limited number of apparel designs in the design regis-
 
71 INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, supra note 66, at 9.   
72 See id. (explaining that the unregistered design right extends ten years from when 
the designer first marks an item and is limited to fifteen years from the design’s creation). 
73 Id. 
74 See General Questions, OFFICE FOR HARMONIZATION IN INTERNAL MARKET, 
http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/RCD/FAQ/RCD1.en.do (last visited Jan. 15, 
2012) (“Community design protection is directly enforceable in each Member State 
and it provides both the option of an unregistered and a registered Community design 
right for one area emphasizing all Member States.”). 
75 Id.    
76 Id.    
77 Id.  
78 See id.  See generally Council Regulation 6/2002, Community Designs, 2002 O.J.  
(L 3/1) (EC) (establishing the terms and conditions of the unregistered and registered 
Community design rights).      
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try.79  Moreover, these scholars argue that despite the intellectual 
property protections available in the European Union, there is still 
widespread copying of fashion designs and “fashion firms do not ex-
hibit marked differences in behavior despite these very different legal 
environments” in the United States and the European Union.80  How-
ever, a recent article has observed that “the new E.U. unregistered de-
sign right is becoming ‘extremely useful for fashion designers,’ 
prompting a spate of recent suits and settlements.”81  Therefore, any 
conclusions as to the success or failure of the Community design 
right may be premature.  What is clear, however, is that given the 
many similarities between the unregistered Community design right 
and the DPPA and IDPPPA, the European Union’s system will, over 
time, provide key insights into domestic legislation for protecting 
fashion designs.82   
II.  COPYING WITHIN THE FASHION INDUSTRY 
While different forms of copying are commonplace in creative 
industries, including the fashion industry, it is important to distinguish 
what “copying” specifically refers to in intellectual property terms.  
The media’s coverage of government and private corporations’ suc-
cessful policing against counterfeiting and knock-offs does not include 
the form of copying that this Comment addresses.  The widely 
acknowledged legal victories against counterfeiting concern the in-
fringement of well-known trademarks—that is, of logos or symbols that 
identify the source of an item and denote quality and prestige.83  
Counterfeiting is clearly legally actionable and thus these victories 
 
79 See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 12, at 1742 (stating that searches in the 
European Union–wide registry as of June 24, 2006, “yielded 296 designs in the ‘under-
garments, lingerie, corsets, brassieres, nightwear’ category; 960 in ‘garments’; 313 in 
‘headwear’; 2311 in ‘footwear, socks and stockings’; 197 in ‘neckties, scarves, necker-
chiefs and handkerchiefs’; 111 in ‘gloves’; 706 in ‘haberdashery and clothing accesso-
ries’; and 14 in ‘miscellaneous’”). 
80 Id. at 1743.   
81 Myers, supra note 65, at 65 (citing IP and Business:  Intellectual Property in the Fashion 
Industry, WIPO MAG., May–June 2005, at 16, 16, available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
export/sites/www/wipo_magazine/en/pdf/2005/wipo_pub_121_2005_05-06.pdf). 
82 See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 12, at 1743-44 (commenting that “[t]his 
cross-jurisdictional comparison has important implications” for the DPPA, which 
“would mimic prevailing EU law in some important ways”).   
83 See, e.g., Meredith Derby & Liza Casabona, Counterfeiting Wars Heat Up for Shoe 
Players, FOOTWEAR NEWS, Oct. 2, 2006, at 2, 10 (describing the successes of shoe manu-
facturers such as New Balance and Asics in policing their trademarks against infringers).   
Wong FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  3/7/2012 8:24 PM 
2012 Protecting Fashion Designs 1153 
come as no surprise.84   By contrast, there have been few notable legal 
victories against the duplication of the exact shape and appearance of 
fashion designs.  This is most likely due to the lack of intellectual 
property protection for these elements.  Fashion designers have used 
the limited forms of legal protection available to seek redress against 
copiers—through trade dress claims, for example—and have only 
achieved limited success.85  This kind of copying has not achieved the 
same social disapprobation in the public’s mind as counterfeiting 
has.86  Nevertheless, developments in the fashion industry point both 
to a growing copying threat that needs to be addressed and to Con-
gress’s heightened awareness of the current dearth of legal protection.    
A.  The Current Trend of Duplication in the United States 
The scale at which the duplication of fashion designs takes place 
has dramatically increased, while the cost of such copying has de-
creased.  Globalization and the rapid pace of electronic communica-
tion have enabled the transmission of designs to low-cost 
manufacturers overseas and the production and sale of copies in a 
time frame so short that designers may not yet have received orders on 
their own designs.87  These changes in the production process have 
been accompanied by a revolution in the relationship between retailer 
and consumer.  A startling consequence of the large-scale, low-cost 
 
84 See The Spread of Counterfeiting:  Knock-Offs Catch On, ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 2010, at 
81 (discussing the current surge in counterfeiting and detailing technological, legal, 
and regulatory efforts to combat it).  
85 See Irene Tan, Note, Knock It Off, Forever 21!  The Fashion Industry’s Battle Against 
Design Piracy, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 893, 920-21 (2010), for a discussion of litigation between 
fashion designer Trovata and Forever 21.  The events ended in a mistrial because the 
jury could not agree on whether Forever 21 had committed a trade dress violation.  Id.  
The parties settled rather than retry the case.  Id. 
86 Cf. Alexandra Steigrad, Luxury Counterfeiters Found Guilty, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY 
( June 11, 2010), http://www.wwd.com/business-news/legal/counterfeiters-found-guilty-
3113789 (reporting on the convictions of two New York importers for trafficking and 
smuggling counterfeit luxury goods worth more than $100 million).   
87 See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 1, at 1171 (detailing the speed with which a design 
can be electronically ordered overseas for mass production); see also IDPPPA Hearing,  
supra note 2, at 99 (testimony of Lazaro Hernandez, Designer & Cofounder, Proenza 
Schouler) (discussing the rise of websites “where [copiers] get a runway show, and they 
can literally zoom in to the garment front and back, copy stitch for stitch . . . and ship it 
before [designers] can even take orders on the product”); cf. Alessandra Galloni, Faked 
Out:  As Luxury Industry Goes Global, Knock-Off Merchants Follow, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2006, 
at A1 (“Some fashion houses also have moved parts of their production to Asia in order 
to trim costs.  The proximity to actual luxury goods has enabled counterfeiters to raise 
quality and copy products faster.”). 
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model of fast-fashion firms is the ability it gives these firms to quickly 
adjust the portfolio of designs offered to the consumer and push out 
only the most popular products.88  These changes in the fashion indus-
try have enabled the dawn of the fast-fashion firm.  Thus, a fast-fashion 
firm is able to copy an original design, produce it abroad, bring it to 
market, see if it succeeds, and then quickly copy another design if the 
first does not sell.  This combination of trendiness, diversity, and low 
cost provides an attractive value proposition to consumers.     
This Comment argues that this large-scale, low-cost rapid copying 
is eliminating any opportunity for fashion designers to recoup their 
investment and benefit from the fruits of their labor.  The most noto-
rious fast-fashion firm is Forever 21, which, according to one study, was 
a defendant in fifty-three suits for copyright and trademark infringe-
ment between 2003 and 2008.89  It is important to note that while low 
design expense is a central component of the fast-fashion model, not 
every fast-fashion firm creates replicas of original designs; in fact, two 
other well-known fast-fashion firms—H&M and Zara—have attracted 
almost no litigation because they avoid exact copying by reinterpreting 
and adapting popular designs.90  
To complicate the situation further, it appears that fast-fashion 
firms do not target luxury designers that have great brand recognition, 
but prefer budding or mid-range designers that lack the clout of luxu-
ry designers in the marketplace.91  As these budding designers’ pieces 
often do not exhibit complex tailoring, use exotic fabrics, or incorpo-
rate the identifiers of a luxury brand, trademark law does not provide 
a potential legal remedy.92  Consequently, these designers are particu-
 
88 See Margaret Bruce & Lucy Daly, Buyer Behaviour for Fast Fashion, 10 J. FASHION 
MARKETING & MGMT. 329, 330-31 (2006) (discussing how fast-fashion retailers can push 
popular trends quickly, and explaning how some retailers source and buy weekly to 
introduce new items and replenish stock); see also Hemphill & Suk, supra note 1, at 
1171 (“The most striking consequence of low-cost, high-scale, rapid copying is . . . the 
ability to wait and see which designs succeed, and copy only those.”). 
89 Hemphill & Suk, supra note 1, at 1173.   
90 Id. at 1172-73.   
91 See, e.g., Complaint at 4, 9-11, Trovata, Inc. v. Forever 21, Inc., No. 07-1196 (C.D. 
Cal. Oct. 8, 2007) (detailing the defendant’s alleged duplication of numerous pieces of 
clothing made by plaintiff, an up-and-coming fashion label); Complaint at 2-3 Harajuku 
Lovers, LLC v. Forever 21, Inc., No. 07-3881 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2007) (alleging that 
Forever 21 duplicated the plaintiff label’s trademark). 
92 See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 1, at 1175-76 (discussing the lack of protection 
for a dress whose shape and exterior details did not “so powerfully call to mind” the 
designer’s identity that it made a good target for duplication); see also supra text ac-
companying note 12.  As a matter of fact, even for an established luxury brand such as 
Louis Vuitton, bringing a trademark infringement case can be difficult and fruitless.  
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larly vulnerable to copying and can conceivably have their profits er-
roded by copiers who bring exceedingly similar, if not identical, de-
signs so rapidly to the marketplace.93   
B.  Academic Debate on the Duplication of Fashion Designs 
Given the recent developments and accompanying lawsuits in the 
fashion industry, it comes as no surprise that the question of whether 
fashion designs should receive intellectual property protection has 
attracted much scholarship and debate.  The prevailing views can be 
separated into three distinct camps.  
1.  Low Intellectual Property Protection 
Professors Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman first promul-
gated the idea that the fashion industry operates in what they describe 
as a “low-IP equilibrium,” meaning that intellectual property law pro-
vides little protection to fashion designs and “yet this low level of legal 
protection is politically stable.”94  Raustiala and Sprigman argue that a 
low-IP equilibrium is “paradoxically advantageous” to fashion design-
ers because the lack of protection allows for the accelerated diffusion 
of designs.95   Thus, in this process of what they call “induced obsoles-
cence,” fashion designs have a very short lifespan and the cycle of in-
novation is driven faster than it would otherwise be.96  They recognize 
the fashion industry as an “important anomaly in American law” and as 
a new paradigm of sorts.97  The amount of innovation that exists within 
the industry despite the lack of protection contradicts the standard 
 
See Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 415, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (denying plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction for defendant’s alleged 
copyright infringement).        
93 See IDPPPA Hearing, supra note 2, at 4-5 (testimony of Lazaro Hernandez, De-
signer & Cofounder, Proenza Schouler) (“The most severe damage from lack of pro-
tection falls upon emerging designers, such as ourselves, who everyday lose orders and 
potentially our entire business. . . . [Piracy] makes it harder for young designers to start 
up their own companies.  And isn’t that the American Dream?”).   
94 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 12, at 1699. 
95 See id. at 1722 (arguing that stiffer protections would slow the pace of the fashion 
cycle); see also Cherie Yang, The IDPPPA:  A Cure Worse Than Its Illness?, COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. ONLINE (Nov. 28, 2010, 2:45 PM), http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/11401  
(noting that Jennifer Jenkins, an intellectual property expert, believes the right to copy 
benefits the fashion industry by making original designs trendier and more affordable 
to a group of individuals who could not have bought the original).   
96 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 12, at 1722 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
97 Id. at 1762. 
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account of intellectual property rights, which predicts that lack of in-
tellectual property rights destroys innovation.98    
While the low-IP equilibrium provides a compelling description of 
the fashion industry in the United States, this theory does not answer 
the normative question of the optimal scope of intellectual property 
protection for fashion designs, especially given the advent of the fast-
fashion firm.  Raustiala and Sprigman’s presumption seems to be that 
value to society is measured in terms of innovation, so if there is no 
innovation problem in a low-IP equilibrium, there need not be protec-
tion for fashion designs.  As empirical support, they note that although 
the legal regimes of the European Union generally protect fashion  
designs, there are few lawsuits, much copying, and underutilized legal 
protection.99  This evidence is probative but inconclusive.  For example, 
one commentator has noted that intellectual property protection “does 
seem to have led to more innovation in U.K. cheap chic, as the chains 
have found ways to design around the legal protection.”100  Also, since 
the publication of Raustiala and Sprigman’s article, there have been 
many high-profile lawsuits concerning fashion designs,101 casting doubt 
on the argument that providing copyright protection in the United 
States would follow the unsuccessful path of the European experience.   
Moreover, in a recent hearing before the House Subcommittee on 
Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet, Professor Chris-
topher Sprigman testified against the passage of the IDPPPA, again 
emphasizing that copying “does not deter innovation,” but “speeds it 
up.”102  To support his argument that the fashion industry is currently 
more robust than ever, he presented data showing that for women’s 
dresses from 1998 to the present, the top two deciles—that is, the most 
expensive garments in the industry—experienced 250% price growth 
while the rest of the industry got cheaper or stayed at stable prices.103  
One explanation for the price growth in the top deciles is that copyists 
 
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 1740-45.   
100 Myers, supra note 65, at 74.  
101 See, e.g., Complaint at 5, Balenciaga Corp. v. Steve Madden, Ltd., No. 1:09-5458, 
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2009), 2009 WL 5124009 (alleging copyright and trade dress in-
fringement); see also Sharon Clott, Balenciaga Sues Steve Madden, N.Y. MAG. THE CUT BLOG 
(Dec. 18, 2009, 12:00 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/fashion/2009/12/balenciaga 
_sues_steve_madden.html (describing fashion house Balenciaga’s allegations against 
Steve Madden for copying an eye-catching shoe design). 
102 IDPPPA Hearing, supra note 2, at 75 (testimony of Christopher Sprigman, Profes-
sor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law).  
103 Id. at 76.  
Wong FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  3/7/2012 8:24 PM 
2012 Protecting Fashion Designs 1157 
have forced mid-range designers out of the market, leaving only the 
most expensive dresses at the high end.104  However, Professor Sprig-
man cites this data as evidence of a “healthy competitive industry,” as 
designers are able to consistently increase prices.105  While the data 
may be subject to different interpretations, the widening gulf between 
high- and low-end designers does suggest that the dynamics of fashion 
are changing and require a legal response.     
2.  High Intellectual Property Protection 
On the other side of the debate lie the proponents of extensive 
intellectual property protection for fashion designs.  Supporters of this 
approach consist mainly of fashion designers and industry insiders 
who believe that fashion designs, like any other creation, merit explicit 
protection under intellectual property laws.  The premise of this view 
is the conventional economics argument that intellectual property 
protection is necessary to foster innovation because without such pro-
tection, designers will not be able to receive adequate returns or re-
wards for their creativity.  Thus, on behalf of over four hundred 
American designers,106 the CFDA has lobbied to extend copyright to 
designs107 and to pass proposed legislation like the DPPA and now the 
IDPPPA.108   Speaking on behalf of the CFDA, designer Jeffrey Banks 
testified before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intel-
lectual Property, describing the plight of young designers and the 
economic harm that copying has caused:   
With each new season, designers put their imagination to work, and they put 
their resources at risk. . . . It takes tens of thousands of dollars to start a busi-
ness.  And every season when you go out to create . . . you are talking about 
thousands and thousands of dollars.  Then if you go to put on a show, you 
can spend anywhere from fifty thousand dollars to a million dollars . . . .109  
 
104 See id. at 97 (testimony of Jeannie Suk, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School) 
(arguing that the data reflect “producer desperation rather than a sign of health” be-
cause mid-range designers are forced to exit the market). 
105 Id. at 75 (testimony of Christopher Sprigman, Professor of Law, University of 
Virginia School of Law).  
106 About the CFDA, CFDA, http://www.cfda.com/about-the-cfda (last visited Jan. 
15, 2012).  
107 See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 12, at 1756.  
108 See Schumer Introduces Legislation to Protect Fashion Design, CFDA, http://www. 
cfda.com/schumer-introduces-legislation-to-protect-fashion-design (last visited Jan. 15, 
2012) (reporting on the CFDA’s endorsement of the IDPPPA). 
109 A Bill to Provide Protection for Fashion Design:  Hearing on H.R. 5055 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
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Banks pleaded for the passage of the DPPA, emphasizing in par-
ticular how American intellectual property law has lagged behind oth-
er jurisdictions.110  It is clear that despite the CFDA’s support for the 
DPPA and the IDPPPA, these pieces of legislation are viewed as con-
cessions of sorts, given that the proposed term of protection for fash-
ion designs is only three years.111    
Lazaro Hernandez, a designer of the brand Proenza Schouler, also 
recently testified in favor of the IDPPPA, echoing many of the argu-
ments advanced by Banks.  Hernandez emphasized that designers 
spend significant sums of money before a first order is received and 
that because of a lack of intellectual property protection for fashion 
designs, “the U.S. has become a haven for copyists who steal designers’ 
ideas . . . and the first if not only market for Chinese exporters of pi-
rated designs.”112   
Thus, the CFDA and the fashion designers it represents firmly be-
lieve that the United States is lagging behind the rest of the world in 
intellectual property protection and that immediate action is necessary.  
They gladly would push for even more protection were Congress recep-
tive to such pleas.  Recent events and the extensive media coverage of 
lawsuits against fast-fashion copiers have helped proponents of high 
intellectual property protection gain some traction in the debate.113     
3.  Intermediate Intellectual Property Protection 
There is middle ground between the low-IP equilibrium endorsed 
by Professors Raustiala and Sprigman and the “more protection, the 
better” approach favored by fashion industry insiders.  This intermedi-
ate view is characterized by the argument that copyright should be ex-
tended to fashion designs, but that these protections should be limited 
and carefully crafted to preserve innovation.  The proponents of this 
view have assisted in drafting the DPPA and the IDPPPA and have 
 
Cong. 11-12 (2006) [hereinafter DPPA Hearing] (statement of Jeffrey Banks, Fashion 
Designer, Council of Fashion Designers of America).   
110 See id. at 11 (“I will note . . . that in Europe most member states protect fashion 
for a term of 25 years, with registration.  In Japan, it is 15.”).     
111 See id. at 13 (“Europe grants designs 25 years of protection.  Boat hulls in this 
country receive 10.  We only ask for three.”).  
112 IDPPPA Hearing, supra note 2, at 4 (testimony of Lazaro Hernandez, Designer & 
Cofounder, Proenza Schouler). 
113 See The IDPPPA—Is The Third Time A Charm?, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE, 
http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/11357 (last visited Jan. 15, 2012) (“For now, it 
seems like the IDPPPA is likely to pass, given that unlike the first two tries, it now has 
the support of both the CFDA and AAFA.”); see also supra note 53.      
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worked to ensure that the suggested forms of protection promote in-
novation in the fashion industry.    
Professor Susan Scafidi advocated for the DPPA and currently 
supports the IDPPPA.  In her written statement on the DPPA to the 
House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Proper-
ty, Professor Scafidi contended that a limited form of copyright pro-
tection is well suited to the dynamics of the fashion industry and that 
copyright legislation would best preserve innovation.114  She explained: 
The fashion industry’s decision not to seek full copyright protection, but 
instead to request only a limited three-year term, is particularly appropri-
ate to the seasonal nature of the industry.  This period will allow designers 
time to develop their ideas in consultation with influential editors and 
buyers prior to displaying the work to the general public, followed by a 
year of exclusive sales as part of the designer’s experimental signature line, 
and another year to develop diffusion lines or other mass-market sales.
115
 
Scafidi also stressed that “[a]s with other forms of literary and artistic 
work, copyright law is clearly capable of protecting specific expressions 
while allowing trends and styles to form.”116 
Professors Scott Hemphill and Jeannie Suk also support the use of 
copyright to protect fashion designs, but from a slightly different per-
spective.  They engage in a cultural analysis and draw a fine distinction 
“between close copying on one hand and participation in common 
trends on the other hand.”117  Hemphill and Suk argue that the kind of 
exact copying that some fast-fashion firms engage in is extremely det-
rimental to innovation.118  Essentially, they contend that exact copying 
reduces the profits of the original designer and diminishes demand 
for the original design.119  As a result, designers who are “unprotected 
against design copying see a disproportionate effect on their profita-
bility, and hence are discouraged from innovating.”120  The lack of 
protection from copying further results in a shift toward the “creation 
of designs that are legally more difficult to copy” and “creation of 
 
114 DPPA Hearing, supra note 109, at 79 (statement of Susan Scafidi, Associate Pro-
fessor, Southern Methodist University).  
115 Id. at 84.  
116 Id.  
117 Hemphill & Suk, supra note 1, at 1153.   
118 Id. at 1170. 
119 See id. at 1176 (“In addition to replacing sales, the prevalence of cheaper copies 
also may reduce demand for the original design.  This ‘snob’ effect may reflect a con-
sumer’s desire for distinction from lower-status consumers or from other consumers 
more generally.” (internal footnotes omitted)).   
120 Id.  
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goods that are naturally (as opposed to legally) more difficult to 
copy . . . for example, goods involving unusual or expensive materials 
or difficult workmanship.”121  These shifts are unfavorable because they 
move fashion toward the “high-end realm of status and luxury” and 
away from innovation.122 
Hemphill and Suk suggest that it is possible to tailor protections 
to attack exactly the type of copying that is the most detrimental to 
designers.  Rather than relying on the existing legal standard of sub-
stantial similarity, they suggest a rule where “showing a substantial dif-
ference does indeed excuse the wrong.”123  This is a rule of “substantial 
dissimilarity,”124 dictating that “[i]f a designer copies protectable ex-
pression from an earlier work, yet also makes significant changes, the 
designer is no longer liable.”125  This rule of “substantial dissimilarity” 
is not found in existing law or the IDPPPA, which requires an infring-
ing article to be “substantially identical.”126  However, the IDPPPA does 
in some respects reflect the reasoning and analysis of Hemphill and 
Suk.127  In fact, Professor Suk recently testified in favor of the IDPPPA, 
speaking to the ability of the legislation to effectively target exact copy-
ing.128  She explained that the IDPPPA “reflects a judgment that 
knockoffs are not necessary to the business model of high-volume 
sellers of on-trend clothing at a low price point” and that fast-fashion 
firms “would have to innovate and invest somewhat in design rather 
than only replicate others’ work in full.”129  Therefore, contrary to the 
view of Professor Sprigman, the IDPPPA can promote rather than 
stifle innovation.130      
 
121 Id. at 1179.  
122 Id. at 1180.   
123 Id. at 1188. 
124 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
125 Id. at 1187.   
126 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.  
127 See Christopher Muther, If the Shoe Fits, They’ll Copy It:  Should the Law Protect Fash-
ion from Knockoffs?, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 7, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 4750442 
(noting that Professor Suk helped Senator Schumer draft the IDPPPA).   
128 See IDPPPA Hearing, supra note 2, at 14 (testimony of Jeannie Suk, Professor of 
Law, Harvard Law School).   
129 Id.   
130 See id. at 17 (“Indeed, the modifications copyists would be required to make 
under the IDPPPA would serve to expand consumer choice . . . .”). 
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III.  HOW GAME THEORY INFORMS INTELLECTUAL  
PROPERTY PROTECTION 
While the academic debate surrounding fashion designs summa-
rized in Part II is lively and insightful, it lacks bottom-up analysis, that is 
investigation at the level and from the perspective of the fashion de-
signer or fast-fashion firm.  Rather than paint in broad strokes and ar-
gue whether a legal regime may promote innovation, I draw on game 
theory to examine, at the most fundamental level, the economic incen-
tives that fashion designers and fast-fashion firms face, as well as the 
decisions that they would make under different legal regimes.   
Law and economics has long provided a perspective into intellec-
tual property law.  It is broadly accepted that one of the tenets of intel-
lectual property protection is incentivizing innovation.131  Therefore, 
even in the context of the fashion industry, it is easy to suggest that 
given the value society assigns to fashion designs,132 it is important to 
provide an adequate level of intellectual property protection to ensure 
that fashion designers are able to earn from and sustain their creative 
activities.  Game theory studies the strategic behavior between indi-
viduals, which arises when “two or more individuals interact and each 
individual’s decision turns on what that individual expects the others 
to do.”133  Because game theory provides a unique tool to examine in-
dividual behavior, it has proven immensely useful in analyzing the im-
pact of laws.134   
The most basic and common game theory example in legal schol-
arship is the prisoner’s dilemma, which is an illustration of the prob-
lem of joint coordination.  The setup of the prisoner’s dilemma 
involves two criminals who have both committed a serious crime.135  
Without the testimony of the criminals, the police have only enough 
evidence to charge each of them for a lesser crime.  The police inter-
 
131 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property:  The Law and Economics Approach, 
J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2005, at 57, 58  (discussing the use of intellectual property law 
to resolve the tension between innovators who invest in their inventions and copiers 
who seek to profit without investing in design).     
132 The size of the U.S. fashion industry is currently estimated to be $340 billion.  
IDPPPA Hearing, supra note 2, at 4 (testimony of Lazaro Hernandez, Designer &  
Cofounder, Proenza Schouler). 
133 DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 1 (1994). 
134 See id. at 14-28 (explaining how game theory accurately predicts the impact of 
different tort liability rules such as no liability, strict liability, negligence, and contribu-
tory negligence on the behavior of individuals). 
135 This illustration of the prisoner’s dilemma is taken from AVINASH DIXIT & 
SUSAN SKEATH, GAMES OF STRATEGY 85-87 (Ed Parsons ed., 1st ed. 1999).   
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rogate the two criminals separately and tell them that they are each 
looking at three years of jail time for the lesser crime if neither con-
fesses.  However, if one of the criminals confesses to the serious crime 
and tells the truth, his sentence will be reduced to one year, while the 
other criminal will receive a more severe sentence of twenty-five years.  
If both criminals confess, they will each receive reduced sentences of 
ten years.  The choices that the two criminals face and the correspond-
ing jail sentences are represented in the matrix below: 
 
Figure 1:  The Prisoner’s Dilemma136 
 
Sentence: (Criminal 1, Criminal 2)            Criminal 2 
  
Confess 
Don’t 
Confess
Criminal 1 
Confess 
(10, 10) (1, 25) 
Don’t 
Confess
(25, 1) (3, 3) 
 
One way to solve this “game” is to determine what strategies the 
two criminals would choose such that neither criminal could do better 
given the strategy the other has chosen.  This concept is known as a 
Nash equilibrium.137  Applied to the prisoner’s dilemma, a Nash equi-
librium requires that each criminal chooses a strategy that is a “best 
response” to the other criminal’s strategy.138  From the perspective of 
each criminal, this makes intuitive sense.  It would be irrational to 
choose any action except the one that is the best response and maxim-
izes individual payoff, which in this case means a lower sentence.     
There is only one pair of strategies in the prisoner’s dilemma that 
creates a Nash equilibrium:  when both criminals confess to the crime.  
This conclusion is reached by considering the “best response” of each 
criminal to a given strategy.  If Criminal 2 confesses, the optimal strat-
 
136 Id. at 86 fig.4.2. 
137 See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 133, at 21-23 (defining a Nash equilibrium as “[t]he 
combination of strategies that players are likely to choose . . . in which no player could 
do better by choosing a different strategy given the strategy the other chooses.” (em-
phasis omitted)).   
138 Id. at 23. 
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egy for Criminal 1 is to confess as well because a ten-year sentence is 
preferable to a twenty-five-year sentence.  Alternatively, if Criminal 2 
does not confess, the optimal strategy for Criminal 2 is to confess be-
cause a one-year sentence is preferable to a three-year sentence.  Crim-
inal 1 will always confess regardless of the actions of Criminal 2.  
Criminal 2 faces the same choices as Criminal 1 and will pursue the 
same strategy.  If Criminal 1 confesses, Criminal 2 will also confess, 
and if Criminal 1 does not confess, Criminal 2 again will prefer to con-
fess.  Criminal 2’s best strategy is, therefore, also always to confess.   
Thus, both Criminals 1 and 2 will choose to confess, as neither can 
do better and receive a lower sentence given the fact that the other has 
decided to confess.  This results in a Nash equilibrium.  However, the 
key insight from the prisoner’s dilemma is that this one Nash equilib-
rium, where both criminals confess, is not optimal for the two crimi-
nals.  If both criminals could coordinate their strategies and jointly 
decide not to confess, they would secure the optimal outcome in the 
game:  a three-year sentence.   
Some structural aspects of the prisoner’s dilemma merit emphasiz-
ing.  First, the situation presented above assumes that the game is 
“one-shot,” meaning the two criminals interact on a single occasion 
and never play the game again.139  In game theory, repeated interac-
tions are often studied because the equilibrium in a one-shot game 
may not be the equilibrium in the same game if it were repeated.140  In 
the one-shot version of the prisoner’s dilemma, the Nash equilibrium 
constitutes both criminals confessing and, as a result, serving ten years 
in jail.  Both criminals could receive shorter sentences and be better 
off if they could coordinate and mutually commit to stay silent, an 
equilibrium that does not arise in a one-shot setting. 
This equilibrium is possible in a repeated setting.  Consider the 
situation in which both criminals agree beforehand that they will not 
confess and the situation will be repeated.  Even though each criminal 
has the incentive to confess and breach his agreement to the other in 
order to receive the lightest sentence possible, he will not do so be-
cause of the possibility of retribution in the next round.141  As long as 
there is uncertainty as to when the game will end, the criminals will 
have the incentive to adhere to their strategy of not confessing.  Once 
the repetition is certain to end, this finite game unravels into the one-
 
139 Id. at 21-23. 
140 See id. at 165. 
141 See generally DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 135, at 257-66 (overviewing the potential 
solutions to the prisoner’s dilemma, one of which is infinite repetition of the game).   
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shot game, and the two criminals return to the original Nash equilib-
rium, in which they both confess.142  Thus, the distinction between one-
shot and repeated games is critical.   
A second structural aspect of the prisoner’s dilemma is that it is a 
simultaneous game, in which two parties must concurrently decide on 
the best course of action without knowing how the other party will be-
have.143  While this simultaneous game is relevant and applicable to 
many contexts, other interactions are represented better through se-
quential games, in which parties move in turns, each one deciding 
with full knowledge of the other party’s chosen strategy.144  A common 
application of sequential games is market entry; for example, when a 
firm enters a new market, an incumbent firm can choose to compete 
or to accommodate in response to new competition in the market.145  
Sequential games are often represented through decision trees.146  De-
cision trees begin at an initial node from which branches are drawn to 
represent the different moves or strategies that players can choose.  
Whether a game takes a sequential or simultaneous form impacts the 
strength of the game as a model for real world interactions and affects 
the insights that can be drawn from it.   
Setting aside these structural assumptions of the one-shot prison-
er’s dilemma, it is clear that the game provides an elegant and simple 
illustration of how a coordination failure arises when parties must 
make simultaneous decisions.  In fact, the appeal of the prisoner’s di-
lemma is so broad that one scholar counted over three thousand law 
review publications that refer to it.147  Meanwhile, the rest of game the-
ory has been neglected, and simple, more insightful games other than 
the prisoner’s dilemma are rarely used in analyzing the law.148  There-
 
142 See id. at 258 (noting that when the endpoint of the game is known “[b]oth 
players cheat right from the start, and the dilemma is alive and well”).   
143 BAIRD ET AL., supra note 133, at 21-23. 
144 DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 135, at 43. 
145 See, e.g., BAIRD ET AL., supra note 133, at 178-86 (providing an example of a se-
quential market entry game).   
146 For examples of decision trees in sequential games, see infra Part IV.   
147 See Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma:  Coordination, Game Theory, 
and the Law 6 ( John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper, No. 437 (2d Series), Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper, No. 241, 2008), available at http://  
ssrn.com/=1287846 (“Legal scholars make great use of the concept, having men-
tioned it [in] an astonishing number of law review publications—over 3000 accord-
ing to my Westlaw search—to explore topics ranging from contracts and property, to 
international law, race discrimination, feminism, social norms, the federal judici-
ary . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
148 See id. at 3.    
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fore, the application of game theory to legal scholarship has been 
somewhat limited in its scope.    
One interesting application of game theory to the law is to model 
how individuals would behave under different standards for legal lia-
bility in tort law.149  This Comment aims to extend this mode of analysis 
to intellectual property protection for fashion designs.  It uses game 
theory to predict the behavior of fashion designers and fast-fashion 
firms in the marketplace under different legal regimes, including the 
pending IDPPPA. 
Game theory rarely has been used to discuss and analyze the opti-
mal scope of intellectual property protection for fashion designs.  To 
date, the only extensive application of game theory to intellectual 
property protection for fashion designs is a recent article that uses the 
prisoner’s dilemma to explain and justify the lack of protection within 
the fashion industry.150  The authors suggest that fashion designers 
prefer an incomplete property regime and enter into a “fashion lot-
tery” each season because they are not sure which designs will become 
hits.151  Thus, designers “participate in a cooperative regime in which 
tolerated imitation at limited levels operates as a form of collective in-
surance that mitigates losses from seasonal product failure and the 
attendant risk of firm insolvency.”152  Whereas the article uses game 
theory to describe the current state of the fashion industry and exam-
ine the incentives and the decisionmaking processes of fashion de-
signers under the current intellectual property regime, this Comment 
engages in a normative analysis, using game theory to evaluate differ-
ent legal regimes and offer policy insights into the optimal scope of 
intellectual property protection for fashion designs.      
IV.  THE GAME THEORY MODEL 
This Comment seeks to model the behavior of fashion designers 
and fast-fashion copiers in order to assess how this behavior changes 
under a variety of legal regimes.  First, I consider the weakest regime, 
in which there is no legal protection at all for fashion designs.  Se-
cond, I consider a regime of uncertain legal protection for fashion 
 
149 See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 133, at 14-28 (explaining how game theory accurately 
predicts the impact of different tort liability rules on the behavior of individuals). 
150 Jonathan M. Barnett et al., The Fashion Lottery:  Cooperative Innovation in Stochastic 
Markets, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 160-61 (2010). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 161.  
Wong FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  3/7/2012 8:24 PM 
1166 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1139 
designs such as the current American system, under which fashion de-
signers do not know whether a claim of infringement can be litigated 
successfully.  Third, I consider a regime under the proposed Innova-
tive Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, which provides ex-
plicit copyright protection to fashion designs.   
A.  Scenario 1:  No Legal Protection 
In this scenario, shown in Figure 2.1, I assume that no legal protec-
tion is available, and thus, a fashion designer cannot obtain any reme-
dy or relief for infringement.  Several structural aspects of the model 
bear emphasis.   
First, I assume that there are two players in this game theory 
model—a fashion designer who creates original apparel (Designer) 
and a fast-fashion firm that copies those designs (Copier).  Second, I 
assign two different possible choices to Copier and Designer.  Copier 
can choose either “Exact Copy”153 and make a close, or complete, copy 
of Designer’s original creation, or choose “Redesign” and incur the 
costs of reinterpreting Designer’s work such that the copy is now dis-
tinguishable from the original design.  This decision reflects the two 
directions that fast-fashion firms seem to embrace.  Copier can emu-
late either Forever 21, which has become a lightning rod for litigation 
due to its close copying, or firms like H&M and Zara, that reinterpret 
designs.154  On the other hand, Designer can either “Enforce” by pur-
suing litigation against Copier and trying to defend its intellectual 
property rights, or “Not Enforce” and allow Copier to continue copy-
ing without any lawsuit.  Third, I make the realistic assumption that 
the two players engage in sequential decisionmaking, rather than mak-
ing their decisions simultaneously as the criminals do in the prisoner’s 
 
153 The term “Exact Copy” is intended to encompass copying activities sufficient to 
trigger legal liability regardless of the rule.  Thus, Exact Copy does not necessarily 
mean that the copy and the original design are indistinguishable, but rather that the 
copy is so similar that it is unequivocal that Copier used Designer’s work. 
154 It is important to maintain a clear distinction between items that are exact cop-
ies of original designs and items that are similar to and draw inspiration from original 
designs.  Exact copying can affect incentives to create in a way that reinterpretation of 
an original design does not.  As Professors Hemphill and Suk explain, 
With respect to close copies, there is no reason to reject the standard justifica-
tion for intellectual property, that permissive copying reduces incentives to 
create.  But this effect must be distinguished from the effects of other trend-
joining activities, which enable differentiation within flocking.  They foster and 
constitute innovation in ways that close copying does not.  
Hemphill & Suk, supra note 1, at 1153; see also supra text accompanying note 90.  
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dilemma.  Specifically, I assume that Copier first decides between its 
two courses of action:  Exact Copy or Redesign.  After Copier makes 
its choice, Designer, whose original design either has been copied 
exactly or redesigned, can act accordingly.  Designer can either 
choose Enforce and sue Copier or choose Not Enforce and let Copier 
off the hook.   
A fundamental assumption of the model is that Copier has greater 
economic incentive to choose Exact Copy than Redesign because an 
exact copy will generate more profit than a redesigned item.  The rea-
soning is that fast-fashion firms are attuned to trends in the market-
place and choose to copy designs that are popular and likely to sell 
well.  Moreover, firms that copy do not have to incur the costs in time 
and money associated with redesign.155  Thus, I expect greater profits 
for Copier, absent enforcement by Designer, when it chooses Exact 
Copy because the similarity to the original design leads to more sales 
of the copy while the firm incurs lower costs than the Designer.    
 
Figure 2.1:  No Legal Protection156 
 
 
155 Cf. Hemphill & Suk, supra note 1, at 1172-73 (describing how firms like Zara 
and H&M employ in-house designers who react to cutting-edge designs with their own 
adaptations of the trend). 
156 This two-step game is inspired by a market-entry game, where an incumbent 
firm must decide whether to engage in predatory pricing against a new entrant to the 
marketplace.  See, e.g., BAIRD ET AL., supra note 133, at 178-86.    
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As Figure 2.1 shows, there are four possible outcomes in the 
game in the “Payoffs” column.  When Copier chooses Exact Copy 
and Designer opts to Not Enforce, Copier gains 100 while Designer 
loses 100.  When Designer chooses Not Enforce, there is no legal ac-
tion, and thus, neither party incurs litigation costs.  The payoff here is 
represented as (100, -100).157  To arrive at this result, I assume that 
Copier’s exact copy of Designer’s creation results in a redistribution of 
wealth from Designer to Copier.  Copier gains 100 and Designer loses 
a corresponding 100.  In economics parlance, the exact copy and the 
original good are substitutes.158   
Even when Copier chooses Exact Copy and Designer chooses En-
force, Copier still gains 100 and Designer still loses 100.  There is no 
remedy for Designer’s decision to Enforce, and thus, no relief for the 
loss of 100 because the legal regime does not offer protection for fash-
ion designs.  However, when Designer chooses Enforce, both parties 
must incur litigation costs of 10, which is 10% of the amount in con-
troversy of 100.159  This litigation is fruitless for Designer, as the legal 
 
157 See supra Figure 2.1, Box A. 
158 The exact magnitude of this substitution effect is subject to debate and empiri-
cal analysis, which thus far has not produced clear answers.  Substantial empirical re-
search on consumer attitudes toward counterfeit goods exists, but the applicability of 
these studies to this Comment is unclear.  These studies do not differentiate between 
trademark violations—counterfeiting in the strictest sense—and the type of violations 
at issue here.  Nevertheless, some of these studies do support the existence of a substi-
tution effect between counterfeits—however broadly the term is defined—and original 
goods.  See, e.g., Peter H. Bloch et al., Consumer “Accomplices” in Product Counterfeiting:  A 
Demand-Side Investigation, 10 J. CONSUMER MARKETING, no. 4, 1993, at 27, 34-35 (ex-
plaining the results of a study finding that consumers sometimes prefer counterfeits).   
This insight seems to apply equally to the duplication of fashion designs.  Cf. 
Stephanie Clifford, In a Downturn, Even Knockoffs Go Downscale, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2010, 
at A1 (noting that for mid-price goods, consumers can be more easily lured into buying 
counterfeit goods).  But see Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street:  Re-
flections on Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 
1381, 1382-86 (2005) (providing a theoretical approach that describes when duplica-
tion by third-party imitators will increase rather than decrease the innovator’s sales).  
Barnett argues that exact copies will lead to increased sales of the original only when 
“(1) the relevant market consists of goods that confer significant status benefits, (2) 
imitators generally produce imitations of the original that are obviously imperfect, and 
(3) the legitimate producer cannot introduce imperfect grades of the original without 
significantly depleting its accumulated brand capital.”  Id. at 1383.  These three condi-
tions are likely not met in the case of fast-fashion firms, as they are known to take ad-
vantage of budding or mid-range designers, whose products do not convey status, and 
to produce copies that are indistinguishable from originals.  See supra notes 91-93 and 
accompanying text.  
159 Litigation costs are not likely to be unreasonably high for infringement cases 
concerning fashion designs.  I assume that litigation costs are 10% of the amount in 
controversy, estimating roughly from average litigation costs in copyright cases of 
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regime does not recognize protection for fashion designs.  Ultimately, 
the payoff to Copier is 90 because Copier gains 100 from copying but 
pays 10 in litigation costs, while the payoff to Designer is -110 because 
Designer loses 100 to redistribution and also incurs an additional 10 
for litigation costs.160  This outcome is represented as (90, -110).161  
When Copier chooses Redesign, Designer faces the same two 
choices of Not Enforce and Enforce.  With Redesign, the original item 
and the redesigned item are no longer sufficiently identical to support 
an infringement lawsuit.  If the Designer chooses Not Enforce, there 
are no litigation costs incurred by either party.  I assume that Copier 
achieves a modest gain of 50 while Designer experiences neither a 
gain nor a loss because Copier’s redesigned item is no longer a direct 
substitute for the original.162  Copier’s redesigned item evokes Design-
er’s original work and participates in the same fashion trend but gener-
ates independent profit.163  The payoff in this situation is (50, 0).164   
If Designer chooses Enforce, Copier still enjoys a modest gain of 
50 while Designer again experiences neither a gain nor a loss.  However, 
both parties now incur litigation costs of 5, which is equal to 10% of 
the 50 in controversy.  Designer’s choice to litigate is even more likely 
to fail than in the situation in which Copier chooses Exact Copy.  The 
 
$700,000 per side when $1 to $25 million is at sake and $1.6 million when over $25 
million is at stake.  Mark A. Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 70 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 186 n.6 (2007) (citing AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, 
REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 24 (2005)).  This low 10% estimate seems reasona-
ble for a variety of intuitive reasons.  First, fast-fashion firms typically copy budding 
designers, so the retail price of the original item is moderate and the retail price of the 
copied item even lower.  Second, fast-fashion firms turn over styles and inventory quick-
ly, so the manufacturing run for any item is likely low.  As such, a fast-fashion firm’s 
profit from copying any particular good, which is one way to measure damages, is un-
likely to reach seven figures.  Finally, the fashion designs at the heart of each lawsuit 
usually do not require the intensive litigation that intellectual property litigation involv-
ing science and technology does.   
160 Generally speaking, the payoff to Copier equals the benefit due to copying mi-
nus the litigation cost and any damages paid to Designer.   At the same time, the payoff 
to Designer equals the loss due to copying minus litigation cost plus the remedy from 
Copier.  In this instance, where there is no legal protection, Copier chooses Exact 
Copy, and Designer chooses Enforce, the payoff to Copier = 100 – 10 – 0 = 90 and the 
payoff to Designer = -100 – 10 + 0 = -110.   
161 See supra Figure 2.1, Box B. 
162 Designers have not pursued action against firms that take the Redesign ap-
proach.  See supra note 90 and accompanying text.  I reason that if designers did suffer 
a meaningful loss from redesigned items, they would have pursued litigation.       
163 See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 1, at 1153 (distinguishing between exact copies 
and redesigns that participate in a common trend).    
164 See supra Figure 2.1, Box C. 
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redesigned item provides a weaker claim in a lawsuit, and again, there 
is no legal protection for fashion designs.  Thus, the payoff to Copier is 
45 because Copier gains 50 and pays 5 for litigation costs while the 
payoff to Designer is -5 due to litigation costs.165  
It is possible to solve this game through a process known as back-
ward induction.166  This process identifies a Nash equilibrium, which 
represents the combination of strategies that the players in this game 
are most likely to adopt.167  First, I assume Copier chooses Exact Copy 
and compare the two outcomes now available to Designer:  Not En-
force and Enforce.  Designer will always choose Not Enforce because 
the payoff of -100 is preferable to the payoff of -110.168  This makes 
sense intuitively as well:  in a legal regime that openly declines to pro-
tect fashion designs, suing Copier and incurring litigation costs serves 
no purpose.  Next, I assume Copier chooses Redesign and compare 
the two outcomes of Not Enforce and Enforce for Designer.  The pay-
off of 0 is preferable to the payoff of -5, so Designer again will always 
choose Not Enforce.169  Here, even if my assumption that Copier’s 
choice to Redesign resulted in neither a gain nor a loss to Designer 
was wrong, Designer would still choose Not Enforce.  If a redesigned 
item was still a substitute to an original design and Copier gained 50 
and Designer lost 50, Designer would still choose Not Enforce because 
incurring litigation costs when no legal remedy exists makes Enforce 
an unattractive choice.170  Thus, I can conclude that regardless of 
whether Copier chooses Exact Copy or Redesign, Designer always will 
decide to Not Enforce.   
Applying this basic logic, Copier can predict that Designer will al-
ways choose Not Enforce.  The game can therefore be simplified to 
the following form:   
 
 
 
 
165 See supra Figure 2.1, Box D. 
166 See, e.g., DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 135, at 49-53.    
167 BAIRD ET AL., supra note 133, at 63 (explaining that “any solution found through 
backward induction” is also a Nash equilibrium). 
168 Compare supra Figure 2.1, Box A, with supra Figure 2.1, Box B.  
169 Compare supra Figure 2.1, Box C, with supra Figure 2.1, Box D. 
170 Consider a case in which Box C represented a payoff of (50, -50) rather than 
(50, 0).  When Designer chooses Enforce after Copier chooses Redesign, it would follow 
that the payoff is (45, -55) because, similar to before, both parties have to incur litigation 
costs of 5 and there is no remedy for Designer in the legal regime.  As a result, Designer 
will choose Not Enforce because a payoff of -50 is preferable to a payoff of -55.   
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Figure 2.2:  No Legal Protection—Simplified Game 
 
 
Thus, all that remains is for Copier to choose between the out-
comes of Exact Copy and Redesign.171  Copier will opt for Exact Copy 
because it prefers the payoff of 100 to the Redesign payoff of 50.  In 
effect, it is better for Copier to take advantage of Designer’s original 
work and creative efforts because Designer cannot receive legal relief.172   
Therefore, the most likely combination of strategies in this game 
is Exact Copy and Not Enforce, which means Copier gains 100 and 
Designer loses 100.173  This outcome indicates that in a legal regime 
with no legal protection, Copier has no incentive to refrain from copy-
ing and Designer has no incentive to police its original work.  This 
outcome also neatly captures the standard economics argument that 
intellectual property rights are necessary for innovation.  Without any 
form of legal protection, there will be a redistribution of wealth from 
Designer to Copier because Copier free-rides off of Designer’s innova-
tion.  While many fashion industry insiders contend that this scenario 
captures the current state of affairs, they are mistaken.  Some fashion 
designers have successfully brought suit against copiers and have been 
able to at least reach a settlement, if not obtain a judgment.  To accu-
 
171 Compare supra Figure 2.2, Box A, with supra Figure 2.2, Box C. 
172 It bears emphasizing that the payoff of 50 to the Copier for Redesign is a place-
holder.  I assume as a basic premise that the profits from copying a work exactly will be 
greater than the profits from redesigning the work.  See supra text accompanying note 
155.  Thus, in a regime with no legal protection, Copier will always choose Exact Copy 
and will never choose Redesign. 
173 See supra Figure 2.2, Box A. 
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rately represent the uncertainty in the current legal regime governing 
fashion designs, I will consider modifications to the basic game pre-
sented so far.    
B.  Scenario 2:  Uncertain Legal Protection  
(The Current State of the Law) 
 In this scenario, it is uncertain whether legal protection is avail-
able for fashion designs.  In other words, it is unclear whether any giv-
en lawsuit will succeed.  This world of uncertainty closely resembles 
the current state of intellectual property law in the United States.  In 
the United States, fashion designers do bring trademark and trade 
dress lawsuits against copiers, but success in a given suit is hardly as-
sured.174  In a world of uncertainty, Designer does not know whether a 
court will be receptive to its infringement claim.  If Designer believes 
that prospects are good, Designer will choose Enforce and will try to 
pursue litigation.   
But if Designer believes that prospects are poor, will Designer ever 
choose to Enforce and bring litigation?  The answer is potentially yes.  
Even if there is a low likelihood of success and the expected recovery 
from Copier is low because of the uncertain intellectual property re-
gime, Designer will still bring a lawsuit hoping to secure a settlement 
from Copier and thereby mitigate the loss resulting from Copier’s in-
fringement activities.  This type of lawsuit is known as a “negative ex-
pected value” suit.175  To reflect this new dynamic between Designer 
and Copier, I introduce several modifications to the original game 
shown in Figure 2.1:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
174 Barnett and coauthors explain that fashion designers devote most of their re-
sources to trademark infringement prosecution but also engage in selective design 
infringement enforcement based on weak trade dress arguments.  See Barnett et al., 
supra note 150, at 180-81.  Such litigation typically achieves settlement and removal of 
the offending products.  See id. 
175 See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suits with Negative Expected Value (discussing 
the circumstances in which such a negative expected value suit will lead to a positive 
settlement award from a defendant), in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 
AND THE LAW 551, 551-54 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).  
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Figure 3.1:  Uncertain Legal Protection 
 
The basic assumptions of this version of the game theory model 
are the same as described in Section IV.A.  The key difference here is 
that when Designer chooses Enforce and pursues litigation, Copier 
must make a subsequent choice:  settle the lawsuit with Designer (“Set-
tle”) or continue to litigate until a verdict is reached (“Fight”).   
Consider the case where Copier chooses Exact Copy and Designer 
chooses Enforce.  At early stages of litigation, there are negligible costs 
and Copier can choose Settle and pay Designer 30 to resolve the law-
suit.176  Thus, Copier’s gain of 100 becomes 70 and Designer’s loss of 
100 becomes 70.177   If Copier instead chooses Fight, things get some-
what more complicated.  As there is uncertainty as to whether fashion 
designs can be protected, I imagine that there are two possible out-
comes:  “Favorable to Copier” and “Unfavorable to Copier.”178  These 
two possibilities represent the level of a court’s tolerance of Copier’s 
behavior and the strength of Designer’s legal claims that its fashion  
 
176 Whether the Designer will agree to settle obviously varies.  The variables that will 
affect Designer’s decision include subjective evaluation of the strength of the case, level of 
risk-aversion, and discount rate.  The discount rate may be high for a budding designer 
with limited funds and limited means of raising capital.  
177 See supra Figure 3.1, Box B. 
178 See supra Figure 3.1, Boxes C & D. 
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designs indeed are protectable.  The Favorable to Copier outcome 
means that Designer will not prevail in the lawsuit because a court  
declines to extend protection to fashion designs.  The payoff here is 
(90, -110) because Copier gains 100, pays litigation costs of 10, and 
does not pay any remedy, while Designer loses 100 from copying, pays 
litigation costs of 10, and fails to recoup any damages from the lawsuit.179   
The Unfavorable to Copier outcome means that a court accepts 
Designer’s argument and rules against Copier, so Copier must surren-
der all gains from copying activities and pay for Designer’s attorneys’ 
fees.180  Therefore, Copier will receive no benefit from copying and pay 
20 for both parties’ litigation costs, while Designer will receive zero 
because Copier fully compensates for any potential losses.181  Note that 
if Copier chooses Exact Copy and Designer instead chooses Not En-
force, I again assume that Copier will gain 100 and Designer corre-
spondingly will lose 100, as Designer decided not to bring a lawsuit.182  
Now consider the case in which Copier chooses Redesign and De-
signer chooses Enforce.  Copier faces the similar choice between Settle 
or Fight.  If Copier chooses Settle, Copier pays Designer 15 to termi-
nate the lawsuit, and Copier realizes a net gain of 35.183  The incentives 
to settle seem low because Copier chose Redesign and Designer’s 
claim is far weaker than in the case where Copier chooses Exact Copy.  
However, Designer will want to bring this kind of negative expected 
value suit, hoping to secure settlement. 184   Settlement may be appeal-
ing to Copier because it provides certainty and reduces Copier’s ex-
penditure of time and resources on litigation.  If Copier chooses Fight, 
I assume that the lawsuit is fruitless for Designer, as the redesigned 
item does not support a strong enough claim for Designer to prevail 
in the lawsuit.185  Thus, as in Figure 2.1, the payoff to Copier is 45, as 
 
179 See supra Figure 3.1, Box C. 
180 Indeed, it is possible that the case settles at the last minute before the court 
reaches an adverse verdict.   There are few fashion design infringement cases that have 
gone through trial and reached a verdict.  For an example of a case that failed to get 
past the jury see Irene Tan, supra note 85, at 920-21.  Nevertheless, for the purposes of 
the game theory model, I consider the remote possibility that a court will rule against 
Copier and provide a remedy that restores Designer to the rightful position.  The 
requirement that Copier disgorge all profits from copying and pay Designer’s attor-
neys’ fees is based on the IDPPPA.  See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.     
181 See supra Figure 3.1, Box D. 
182 See supra Figure 3.1, Box A. 
183 See supra Figure 3.1, Box F. 
184 See supra text accompanying note 175.   
185 I make this assumption for the sake of simplification.  When Copier chooses 
Redesign and Designer chooses Enforce, it is again possible to model Copier’s decision 
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Copier gains 50 and pays 5 for litigation costs, while the payoff to De-
signer is -5 due to litigation costs.186  Furthermore, I again assume that if 
Copier chooses Redesign and Designer chooses Not Enforce, there will 
be no loss to Designer and no lawsuit against Copier.  Copier gains 50, 
and Designer neither benefits nor loses.187  
This game also can be solved by the process of backward induction.  
To simplify matters, it is useful to recognize that whether the outcome 
is Favorable to Copier188 or Unfavorable to Copier189 is dependent on an 
exogenous probability, which neither Copier nor Designer knows or 
can control.  I will represent the probability of Favorable to Copier as 
p and correspondingly, the probability of Unfavorable to Copier as 
(1 – p).  Using algebra, I can simplify the game in terms of p:190   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to Fight through two outcomes, Favorable to Copier and Unfavorable to Copier.  When 
the outcome is Favorable to Copier, the payoff will be identical to Box G, where Copier 
gains 50 and pays 5 in litigation costs to receive a net benefit of 45 while Designer pays 
litigation costs of 5.  Copier has litigated the lawsuit to the end and prevailed, so there 
is no legal remedy for Designer.  When the state of the world is Unfavorable to Copier, 
Designer prevails in the lawsuit and is entitled to a legal remedy.  However, the working 
assumption is that Designer suffers no loss as a result of Copier’s redesigned item, so 
there is no harm to remedy.  See supra note 162 and accompanying text.  Thus, there is 
no need to present two states of the world.   
Alternatively, I can consider the situation where Designer does suffer a loss when 
Copier chooses Redesign.  If I assume that the payoff in Box E were instead (50, -50), 
then when the outcome is Unfavorable to Copier, the payoff would be (-10, 0) because 
Copier disgorges all gains, fully compensates Designer for its loss and pays for both par-
ties’ litigation costs.  I can assign the probability q to the payoff of (45, -5) when the out-
come is Favorable to Copier and the probability of (1 – q) to the payoff of (-10, 0) when 
the outcome is Unfavorable to Copier.  I opted against this presentation because fast-
fashion firms such as H&M and Zara, which offer redesigned items, have attracted al-
most no litigation, and thus winning a lawsuit against these firms seems unrealistic.  See 
supra text accompanying note 90.  If I were to present two states of the world, even when 
Copier chooses Redesign, the outcome will not necessarily be any different, as it is de-
pendent on q, the probability that the court’s judgment will be Favorable to Copier, 
which is likely very high.   
186 See supra Figure 3.1, Box G. 
187 See supra Figure 3.1, Box E. 
188 See supra Figure 3.1, Box C. 
189 See supra Figure 3.1, Box D. 
190 The result shown in Figure 3.2, Box C/D is achieved through a simple expected 
value calculation:  (90, -110)p + (-20, 0)(1 – p) = (-20 + 110p, -110p).   
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Figure 3.2:  Uncertain Legal Protection (in terms of p) 
 
The solution to the game is highly sensitive to the probability p, 
which defines whether the outcome is likely to be Favorable to Copier 
or Unfavorable to Copier.  With algebra I can show that if p is less 
than 82%—that is, if courts are favorable to Copier less than 82% of 
the time—the players’ most optimal strategies will be for Copier to 
choose Exact Copy, Designer to choose Enforce, and then for Copier 
to Settle.191   
 
191 I solve the game in Figure 3.2 as follows:  Copier will choose Settle if payoff in 
Box B is greater than in Box C/D, so this means 70 > -20 + 110p, which implies p < 82%.  
Copier will Settle if the probability of a favorable outcome to it is less than 82%. 
First, let’s assume that p < 82%.  Copier will choose Settle in Box B.  Knowing that 
Copier will Settle, Designer must choose between Enforce and Not Enforce.  Designer 
will choose Enforce because the payoff of -70 is greater than the payoff of -100.  Compare 
supra Figure 3.2, Box A, with supra Figure 3.2, Box B.  Now consider what happens if 
Copier chooses Redesign and Designer chooses Enforce.  Copier will Fight and litigate 
to the end because the payoff of 45 is greater than the payoff of 35.  Compare supra Fig-
ure 3.2, Box F, with supra Figure 3.2, Box G.   Knowing that Copier will choose Fight, 
Designer will always choose Not Enforce because the payoff of 0 is preferable to the 
payoff of -5.  Compare supra Figure 3.2, Box E, with supra Figure 3.2, Box G.  Finally, 
Copier must decide between Exact Copy and Redesign, knowing that if it chooses Exact 
Copy, Designer will choose Enforce and they will settle, and that if it chooses Redesign, 
Designer will choose Not Enforce.  Copier will choose Exact Copy because the settle-
ment payoff of 75 is still greater than the payoff of 50 from Redesign.  Compare supra 
Figure 3.2, Box B, with supra Figure 3.2, Box E.  In other words, even though the parties 
settle, the gains from exact copying still exceed the gains from redesigning the work.   
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This sequence of events reflects what has transpired in the fashion 
industry recently.  However, if courts are Favorable to Copier at a rate 
greater than 82%, Copier’s strategy changes and different outcomes 
can emerge.  Given the assumptions of this scenario, it turns out that 
when courts are Favorable to Copier at a rate greater than 82% but 
less than 91% (i.e., 82% < p < 91%), Copier chooses Fight and litigates 
to the end because the state of the world is so favorable. 192   The out-
come here is Box C/D—Copier chooses Exact Copy, Designer chooses 
Enforce, and Copier chooses Fight—because litigating the case to the 
end is worth it for Copier and the benefits from Exact Copy still ex-
ceed those from Redesign.  However, once courts become favorable to 
Copier over 91% of the time (p > 91%), there is a tipping point and 
Designer chooses Not Enforce, without bothering to bring a lawsuit.  
This means that the outcome will be Box A—Copier chooses Exact 
Copy and Designer chooses Not Enforce because the low likelihood of 
success for Designer in court simply is not worth the trouble of bring-
ing a lawsuit.193   
The outcomes derived for the game shown in Figure 3.2 are nei-
ther meant to be a conclusive explanation of how fashion design litiga-
tion would unfold in the real world nor a robust estimation of the 
threshold conditions for the probability, p.   Rather, the game is meant 
to illustrate how uncertainty about the prospects of litigation can 
 
192 Now, let’s assume that p = 90%.  I know that when p is greater than 82%, Copier 
will choose Fight in Box C/D.  See supra note 191.  Since Copier will choose Fight, De-
signer must choose between Enforce or Not Enforce.  Compare supra Figure 3.2, Box A, 
with supra Figure 3.2, Box C/D.  Designer will choose Not Enforce only if -100 > -110p.  
That is, only if p > 91%, which is not true in this example.  Thus, Designer will choose 
Enforce whenever Copier chooses Exact Copy.  On the other hand, I know that if Cop-
ier chooses Redesign, Designer will choose Not Enforce.  See supra note 191.  Thus, 
Copier must decide between Exact Copy and Redesign, knowing that in the former 
case, Designer will choose Enforce and in the latter case, Designer will choose Not En-
force.  Compare supra Figure 3.2, Box C/D, with supra Figure 3.2, Box E.  The likely out-
come is that Copier chooses Exact Copy because, assuming p = 90%, the payoff if 
Designer chooses Enforce and Copier chooses Fight is [-20 + 110(90%), -110(90%)] = 
(79, -99).  This is preferable to (50, 0) for Copier.       
193 Finally, let’s assume that p = 95%.  I know that when p is greater than 82%, Cop-
ier will choose Fight in Box C/D.  See supra note 191.  I also know that Designer will 
choose Not Enforce only if -100 > -110p.  See supra note 192.  That is, only if p > 91%, 
which I assume to be true here.  Therefore, Designer will choose Not Enforce.  As dis-
cussed above, if Copier chooses Redesign, Designer will choose Not Enforce.  See supra 
note 191.  Therefore, Copier knows that Designer will always choose Not Enforce re-
gardless of the choice of Exact Copy or Redesign.  Copier must decide at the outset 
whether to choose Exact Copy or Redesign.  Copier will choose Exact Copy because the 
payoff of 100 is greater than the payoff of 50.  Compare supra Figure 3.2, Box A, with supra 
Figure 3.2, Box E.   
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change the incentives of the parties involved and cause them to be-
have differently than they would in a legal regime where fashion de-
signers are not protected.  For example, where p is less than 82% it is 
possible to arrive at the payoff of (70, -70) with the parties settling and 
Designer experiencing a mitigated loss.  In a legal regime with no pro-
tection at all, the outcome would be (100, -100).194  Based on the struc-
ture of this game, I can say that as the value of p decreases—that is, as 
the outcome of litigation becomes less favorable to Copier and more 
favorable to Designer—the likelihood of the outcome in Box B in-
creases, where Copier must Settle and compensate Designer for copy-
ing its designs.  On the other hand, it becomes evident that as p 
increases and the outcome becomes more favorable to Copier, the un-
certainty over protection for fashion designs decreases and the game 
in Figure 3.2 collapses into the world with no protections.  Essentially, 
when p converges to 100%, Copier chooses Exact Copy and Designer 
chooses Not Enforce, just as Figure 2.2 predicted.   
The determinants of settlement payments from Copier to Designer 
also merit discussion.  I have not described these determinants in de-
tail because the analysis of settlement strategies is a complex area of 
research that has garnered much attention and is beyond the scope of 
this Comment.195       
Finally, it is important to consider the effect of repetition, which 
was discussed earlier in the context of the prisoner’s dilemma.196  I 
noted that as long as the parties were uncertain over the number of 
repetitions of a game, it may be possible to achieve a different equilib-
rium than in a one-shot setting.  I can apply this repeated game analy-
sis to the game with Copier and Designer.  So far, I have assumed that 
Copier and Designer play a one-shot game.  If the parties repeated the 
game shown in Figure 3.2, the question is whether a different equilib-
rium, such as Redesign in Box E, will result.  The answer to this ques-
tion depends on whether the same Copier and Designer participate in 
further iterations of the game.  If there is a different Copier and De-
signer in every round, neither party will have any prior information on 
the other’s behavior and will perceive the game as one-shot and fail to 
 
194 See supra Section IV.A.   
195 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 175, at 551-54 (studying settlement strategies).  
That said, some obvious determinants of settlement payments include the nature of 
litigation costs—whether they are divisible, paid upfront, or subject to a contingency 
fee—and whether new information emerges over the course of litigation that would 
affect the expected value of a judgment.  See id. (identifying the determinants of a neg-
ative expected value suit).  
196 See supra text accompanying notes 139-40.  
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consider future iterations.  In this case, the solution of the game will 
remain the same.  While the fashion industry is very dynamic and con-
sists of many players, there are specific trends that emerge every sea-
son, and there are a select few designers who are trendsetters and 
frequent targets of copying.197  Furthermore, as discussed above, there 
are certain fast-fashion firms, such as Forever 21, that have attracted 
many lawsuits and appear to be repeat players.198  It is possible that a 
new strategy will emerge in a repeated game, especially for fashion de-
signers.  For example, a fashion designer who is a frequent target of 
copying and a repeat player may play different strategies that would 
seem irrational in a one-shot setting.199  Although there are different 
copiers each time, the strategy may make sense because of the repeat 
nature of the game for the designer.  This extended application of my 
game theory model merits further analysis but is beyond the scope of 
this Comment.   
C.  Scenario 3:  Innovative Design Protection and  
Piracy Prevention Act 
I now evaluate the IDPPPA as a potential legal regime.  The effect 
of the IDPPPA on the game theory model is to reduce the uncertainty 
as to whether legal protection is available to fashion designs.  In con-
trast to the scenario presented in Part IV.B, where protection was un-
certain, the IDPPPA dramatically decreases the value of p—the 
likelihood of an outcome favorable to Copier.   Thus, when Copier 
chooses Exact Copy, Designer will have little difficulty demonstrating 
Copier’s liability because the IDPPPA imposes only a “substantially 
identical” standard on allegedly infringing items.200  Now, when De-
signer chooses Enforce, the only reasonable course of action for Copi-
er is to settle, as litigating to the end will result in a verdict in favor of 
Designer.  To illustrate the effect of the IDPPPA on the strategies of 
 
197 Empirical evidence assembled by Hemphill and Suk suggests that there are re-
peat plaintiffs and defendants in fashion design infringement cases.  See The Law, Cul-
ture, and Economics of Fashion:  Intellectual Property Suits Against “Fast Fashion” Firms, 
BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, http://hub.law.harvard.edu/fashion (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2012).  For example, between 2003 and 2008, textile manufacturer L.A. 
Printext Industries filed four suits against Forever 21 and eight against Target.  Id. 
198 See id. (showing dozens of law suits filed against Forever 21 over a five-year period). 
199 See, e.g., DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 135, at 257-66 (discussing how repetition 
alters behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma). 
200 H.R. 2511, 112th Cong. § 2(e)(2) (2011).  
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Copier and Designer, I assume that p = 10%, that is, courts are only 
favorable to Copier 10% of the time.201   
 
Figure 4.1:  Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act 
 
Figure 4.1 is identical to Figure 3.2, except for two slight modifica-
tions.  First, I substitute the value of 10% for p.  The payoff in Box C/D 
represents the expected value of pursuing litigation to the end in this 
regime, which is very unfavorable for Copier.202  Second, when Copier 
chooses Settle, it pays increased amounts in settlement to Designer.  As 
the IDPPPA increases Designer’s rights, it also increases the amount 
Designer will accept as adequate compensation for terminating a favor-
able lawsuit.203    
 
201 The value of p is set at 10% for illustrative purposes.  It is possible to solve this 
game more generally, as was done with Figure 3.2.  Copier will choose Settle in Figure 
4.1, Box B, as long as the payoff is greater than for Fight in Box C/D.  The payoff in 
Box C/D can be expressed as (-20 + 110p, -110p).  See supra note 190.  Thus, Copier will 
choose Settle in Box B if and only if 20 > -20 + 110p, implying that p must be less than 
36%.  As the IDPPPA is crafted to provide additional protection to Designer, it seems 
very likely that p, the likelihood of a favorable outcome to Copier, would fall below this 
36% threshold.      
202 Assuming p = 10%, the payoff in Box C/D of (-20 + 110p, -110p) equals (-9, -11).   
203 Compare supra Figure 3.2, Boxes A & B, with supra Figure 4.1, Boxes A & B; com-
pare also supra Figure 3.2, Boxes E & F, with supra Figure 4.1, Boxes E & F.    
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 This game can be solved through backward induction.  If Copier 
chooses Exact Copy and Designer chooses Enforce, which will most 
likely happen given the favorable legal regime, Copier will again have 
to face the choice to Settle and pay to terminate the lawsuit, or Fight 
and continue with litigation.  Copier will always choose Settle because 
despite the large settlement payment to Designer, the payoff from set-
tling still exceeds the expected payoff from litigation.204  In effect, the 
IDPPPA has foreclosed Fight as a viable strategy for Copier.  Knowing 
that Copier will always choose Settle when it has first chosen Exact 
Copy, Designer is faced with the decision between Enforce and Not 
Enforce.  Designer will always choose Enforce, as the IDPPPA provides 
a protective regime and increases the magnitude of settlement pay-
ments from Copier.  For Designer, the payoff of -20 is preferable to the 
payoff of -100.205  Thus, when Copier chooses Exact Copy, the likely 
outcome is that Designer chooses Enforce, and Copier chooses Set-
tle.206  The payoff to Copier is 20, as the gain of 100 is partly offset by the 
settlement payment of 80.  The payoff to Designer is thus -20, as the loss 
of 100 from copying is mitigated by the settlement amount of 80.    
If Copier instead chooses Redesign and Designer chooses Enforce, 
Copier again faces a choice to Settle or Fight.  Here, the settlement 
payoff also reflects a higher settlement payment necessary to terminate 
the lawsuit, as Designer believes that the lawsuit is more meritorious 
given the IDPPPA.207  The payoff for Fight is the same as before; Copi-
er’s redesigned item will not satisfy the “substantially identical” liability 
standard of the IDPPPA, and if litigation is pursued to the end, Copier 
will prevail.208  Copier will always choose Fight because the item in 
question is redesigned and thus not in violation of the IDPPPA.  The 
payoff of 45, representing a gain of 50 and litigation costs of 5, is pref-
erable to a payoff of 10, representing a gain of 50 and a settlement 
payment of 40.209  Given that Copier will always choose Fight, Designer 
must decide between Not Enforce and Enforce.  The result is that De-
signer will always choose Not Enforce because losing nothing is pref-
erable losing 5.210  Thus, when Copier chooses Redesign, Designer will 
 
204 Compare supra Figure 4.1, Box B, with supra Figure 4.1, Box C/D. 
205 Compare supra Figure 4.1, Box A, with supra Figure 4.1, Box B.   
206 See supra Figure 4.1, Box B. 
207 See supra Figure 4.1, Box F. 
208 See supra Figure 4.1, Box G. 
209 Compare supra Figure 4.1, Box F, with supra Figure 4.1, Box G. 
210 Compare supra Figure 4.1, Box E, with supra Figure 4.1, Box G. 
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always choose Not Enforce.211 I can now simplify Figure 4.1 to repre-
sent the two choices Copier faces: 
 
Figure 4.2:  Innovative Design Protection and Piracy  
Prevention Act—Simplified Game 
 
Based on the simplified game shown above, it is clear that Copier 
will choose Redesign over Exact Copy because the payoff of 50 exceeds 
the payoff of 20.212  Thus, because of the IDPPPA, Copier and Designer 
will choose strategies that result in Redesign and Not Enforce.213  The 
IDPPPA has decreased the value of p so that the outcome is so unfa-
vorable for Copier that there is no longer any benefit to choosing 
Exact Copy.  In addition, the IDPPPA immunizes Designer from any 
adverse effects of exact copying and incentivizes Copier to incur rede-
sign costs to create a new product.  The outcome of the passage of the 
IDPPPA in this game is exactly as the CFDA and many legal scholars 
predict.214    
V.  POLICY INSIGHTS FROM THE GAME THEORY MODEL 
With the game theory model developed in Part IV, I can examine 
not only the individual choices that designers and copiers face, but 
also the impact of these choices on society as a whole given different 
legal regimes.  I promote one legal regime as welfare-maximizing for 
society, but note that there are potential alternatives to the recom-
mended legal regime in achieving this optimum.   
 
211 See supra Figure 4.1, Box E. 
212 Compare supra Figure 4.2, Box B, with supra Figure 4.2, Box E.    
213 See supra Figure 4.2, Box E. 
214 See supra subsection II.B.3.  
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A.  Maximizing Social Welfare and Fostering Innovation 
To determine which legal regime best comports with the goal of 
maximizing social welfare, it is necessary to identify the interests at 
stake.  There are three groups whose interests must be considered:  
fashion designers, fast-fashion firms, and consumers.  I consider seria-
tim the three outcomes from my game theory model outlined in Part 
IV:  (1) where there is no legal protection and Copier chooses Exact 
Copy and Designer chooses Not Enforce; (2) where there is uncertain 
legal protection and Copier chooses Exact Copy, Designer chooses 
Enforce, and Copier chooses Settle; and (3) where the IDPPPA is en-
acted and Copier chooses Redesign and Designer chooses Not En-
force.  These outcomes represent, in order, the outcomes likely to 
emerge as the value of p decreases and the courts become less favora-
ble to Copier.  These outcomes can be evaluated and compared in 
terms of the impact they have on the welfare of fashion designers, fast-
fashion firms, and consumers.  
As discussed in Part IV.B, a regime that has no legal protection for 
fashion designs pushes p toward 100%.  This regime induces Copier to 
choose Exact Copy and Designer to choose Not Enforce because there 
is nothing to be gained from bringing suit.  Further, there is a net ef-
fect of zero on Copier and Designer because I have assumed there is a 
perfect substitution between the original work and the copied item.   
However, equitable concerns and consumers welfare are also at 
stake.  Copier is expending resources to deprive Designer of profits 
from its original design, thereby implementing a redistribution 
scheme, rather than generating independent profits and value.  Under 
this lawless regime, Copier benefits and Designer obviously suffers.  
How about consumers?  Two competing interests govern consumer 
welfare in the fashion industry.  On the one hand, consumers want to 
safeguard and promote innovation, a principle which lies at the heart 
of intellectual property law.215  But on the other hand, consumers want 
fashion at cheaper prices.216  Without any legal protection for fashion 
 
215 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).    
216 See, e.g., The Copycat Economy, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 26, 2002), 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_34/b3796612.htm (commenting 
on the benefits of copying for consumers); cf. Pankaj Ghemawat & José Luis Nueno, 
ZARA:  Fast Fashion 13 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Case Study No. 9-703-497, 2006) (noting that 
low prices and rapid turnover of styles draw Zara shoppers to visit the store an average 
of seventeen times a year, a much higher rate than shoppers of competing retailers).   
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designs, fast-fashion firms threaten consumer welfare by free-riding off 
of fashion designers’ innovation and putting original designers at fi-
nancial risk in the long run.  While cheap exact copies of fashion de-
signs may contribute to consumer welfare in the short run, seemingly 
justifying the lack of legal protection for fashion designers, recent 
events have shown that at some point this tradeoff becomes detri-
mental to designers.217  As fast-fashion firms copy ever more quickly, 
the financial threat to fashion designers, especially budding ones, 
looms large.  Should they fail, consumers will suffer from the loss of 
innovation in design.  Extrapolating even further, fast-fashion firms 
will suffer in the end as well, as they will have fewer innovative fashion 
designs to copy and limited experience in undertaking independent 
innovation.   
 The opportunity for fashion designers to bring suit and secure set-
tlement payments mitigates the problems just discussed.  In Part IV.B, 
I discussed how, for certain values of p, it is possible for Copier and 
Designer to reach the outcome where Copier chooses Exact Copy, De-
signer chooses Enforce, and Copier chooses Settle.  Based on empiri-
cal and anecdotal evidence,218 this is an approximation of the current 
state of the law and the behavior of both fashion designers and fast-
fashion firms.  Here, there is also a net effect of zero on Copier and 
Designer, as Copier’s gains and Designer’s losses simply are redistrib-
uted.  However, in comparison to a regime with no legal protection for 
fashion designs, Copier gains less and Designer loses less, so there is 
less inequity.  The problem that Copier does not engage in any inno-
vation remains.   
As for consumers, there is much uncertainty surrounding the ben-
efits of extending legal protection to fashion designs.  In the short run, 
especially in one-shot games, there is likely to be an increase in con-
sumer welfare because of the availability of cheap exact copies of pop-
ular fashion designs.219  To the extent that legislation curtails this 
 
217 See supra text accompanying notes 106-11.  
218 See Jenna Sauers, Forever 21’s Bizarre Knockoff Empire, JEZEBEL ( Jan. 24, 2011, 4:55 
PM), http://jezebel.com/5742029/forever-21s-bizarre-knockoff-empire (reporting that 
designers including Diane von Furstenberg, Anna Sui, and Anthropologie have won 
settlements against Forever 21); Jenna Sauers, How Forever 21 Keeps Getting Away with 
Designer Knockoffs, JEZEBEL ( July 20, 2011, 4:20 PM), http://jezebel.com/5822762 (not-
ing that Forever 21 continues to copy designs “because all they do is settle”); see also 
Tan, supra note 85, at 920-21 (detailing the litigation and ultimate settlement process 
between a designer and a fast-fashion firm).   
219 See The Copycat Economy, supra note 216 (noting that consumers do benefit from 
quick copying by competitors, but that these “benefits can be fleeting”).   
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copying, there would be a loss in consumer welfare.  However, in a 
long-term repeat game where fast-fashion firms target certain fashion 
designers over and over again,220 consumer welfare likely will suffer 
from the fashion designers’ disincentive to innovate because they can-
not protect their original designs.  Thus, it seems that in the long run 
consumers will benefit from the provision of some intellectual proper-
ty protection for fashion designers.   
The current debate turns on whether a regime that provides un-
certain legal protection to fashion designs strikes the correct balance.  
Not only can designers reap some reward from innovation (albeit less 
than without exact copying), but copiers can offer cheap versions of 
fashion designs to consumers as well.  The idea that the fashion indus-
try exists in a stable, workable, low-IP equilibrium, where fashion de-
signers constantly innovate in response to copiers,221 is consistent with 
the argument that there is a working balance among the interests of 
fashion designers, fast-fashion firms, and consumers.  The current re-
gime thus may seem desirable because it results in a net effect of zero 
on fashion designers and fast-fashion firms, and has a short-term posi-
tive effect on consumer welfare because of the availability of cheap 
copies of fashion designs.   
However, this outcome fails to answer the normative question of 
whether a different regime could enhance welfare.  “Low-IP equilibri-
um” is a diagnosis of the problems that have resulted from past policy 
choices regarding fashion designs rather than a remedy for the under-
lying issue.  The fashion industry has unified against the current legal 
regime, and even Professors Raustiala and Sprigman concede that a 
low-IP equilibrium may be suboptimal.222  If fashion designers are in-
creasingly placed at financial risk by the rapid copying of fast-fashion 
firms, regardless of what short-term benefits may accrue to consumers 
from this copying, the inevitable long-run result will be the loss of in-
novation and a net negative effect on consumer welfare.  Furthermore, 
another argument against the current legal regime is that the burden 
is on fashion designers to go to court, plead their case, and suffer the 
passage of time before a potential settlement is reached.  The mitiga-
tion of designers’ losses through settlement only occurs after copying 
 
220 See supra note 197. 
221 See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 12, at 1699 (defining the concept of a low-
IP equilibrium).   
222 See id. at 1734 (“We . . . do not claim that the current regime is optimal for fash-
ion designers or for consumers.”). 
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has taken place and litigation has begun, which may be too late for 
certain designers.   
Professors Raustiala and Sprigman suggest that additional innova-
tion may derive from more differentiation among designers.223  I 
agree that, in a different legal regime, there could be even greater 
innovation.  Essentially, I argue that fashion design legislation should 
seek to stimulate fast-fashion firms—not fashion designers—to under-
take independent innovation by using their existing infrastructures, 
which thus far have been devoted to copying.  In other words, sec-
ondary designers like Forever 21 can contribute to innovation, rather 
than take advantage of it, by drawing inspiration from primary fashion 
designers and reworking their designs into original creations at low 
price points.  This form of condoned copying finds support in the 
fashion industry because it does not encroach upon designers’ profits 
and sense of ownership over their original designs.224  Hemphill and 
Suk provide further support for this approach.  They argue that by 
incentivizing fast-fashion firms to reinterpret and redesign original 
works, legal protection for fashion designs helps individuals both dif-
ferentiate themselves through fashion and “flock” to participate in 
common trends.225   
The game theory model demonstrates that the IDPPPA is a means 
to achieve this optimal outcome, as represented by Copier’s choice of 
Redesign and Designer’s choice of Not Enforce.226  Instead of a net 
effect of zero on Copier and Designer, there is a net positive effect 
when Copier chooses Redesign because this scenario requires some 
level of fast-fashion firm innovation.  Rather than deprive Designer of 
income from a fashion design, Copier engages in independent innova-
tion and creates a redesigned item that can be consumed apart from 
the original design.  Designer is not worse off, and Copier is still able 
to generate gains.  This outcome is not only equitable, because Copier 
no longer benefits at the expense of Designer, but is also efficient, 
 
223 See id. at 1744.   
224 Some commentators have observed: 
[T]he mass-produced fashion goods industry is about copying, or less conten-
tiously, simplifying current designs to make available products in high volume 
at low prices. . . . This copying is accepted not only because the fashion houses 
benefit from the publicity, but also because the copying legitimates their de-
signs as ones that are desirable and worth copying. 
Brian Hilton et al., The Ethics of Counterfeiting in the Fashion Industry:  Quality, Credence, 
and Profit Issues, 55 J. BUS. ETHICS 345, 350-51 (2004). 
225 Hemphill & Suk, supra note 1, at 1152-53.    
226 See supra Section IV.C.   
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because both sides gain.  From the perspective of the consumer, there 
is a positive impact on welfare because of increased innovation from 
fast-fashion firms redesigning works rather than copying them exactly.  
Arguably, legal protection for fashion designs decreases consumer wel-
fare by eliminating cheap copies of desirable fashion designs.227  How-
ever, it bears emphasis that any such negative impact will likely be 
mitigated or obviated by the affordable and trendy redesigned items 
offered by fast-fashion firms.  Future empirical studies may resolve the 
uncertainty as to whether the relative loss to consumer welfare is offset 
by the gains from innovation.  For the time being, I assume that the gain 
to consumer welfare exceeds the loss given the ascent of fast-fashion 
firms such as H&M and Zara that specialize in redesigned items.228  
Therefore, I posit that legislation like the IDPPPA is welfare maximizing 
because fashion designers are able to enjoy the fruits of their labor, fast-
fashion firms can continue to use their business model by taking inspira-
tion from original designs and offering innovative redesigns, and con-
sumers will enjoy greater diversity in the fashion industry without sacri-
sacrificing clothing at attractive price points.   
B.  Alternatives to the IDPPPA 
I have argued that the IDPPPA enables a legal regime that maximiz-
es social welfare by fostering innovation.  While the IDPPPA definitely 
achieves a desirable result, it is important to question whether the Act 
itself provides the best means of encouraging innovation.  Moreover, 
given that past attempts to extend copyright protection to fashion de-
signs have failed, the IDPPPA very well may meet the same fate.  I dis-
cuss two alternatives to a legislative solution. 
1.  Private Enforcement Through an Industry Guild 
While the dynamics of the fashion industry are unique, parallels 
have often been drawn to other creative industries, such as music and 
film.  It is conceivable that fashion designers could band together in 
an industry group and exercise self-help to protect against the duplica-
 
227 See IDPPPA Hearing, supra note 2, at 81 (comments of Kal Raustiala, Professor, 
University of California at Los Angeles School of Law, and Christopher Sprigman, 
Professor, University of Virginia School of Law) (“Indeed, if Congress acts to hinder 
design copying [by enacting the IDPPPA], it may succeed only in depressing demand 
for new styles, slowing the industry’s growth, enriching lawyers, and raising prices for 
consumers.”).   
228 See generally Ghemawat & Nueno, supra note 216 (discussing the growth and 
success of Zara and the competitive landscape of the fast-fashion industry).   
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tion of fashion designs.  The fashion industry can look to the music 
and motion picture industries, which have undertaken significant an-
tipiracy and anticounterfeiting campaigns and initiatives in recent 
years.229  Other industries facing piracy and counterfeiting have also 
increasingly embraced private measures.230   
Better yet, history provides an example of private enforcement of in-
tellectual property rights in the fashion industry itself.  In the 1930s, 
American clothing manufacturers attempted to organize a private sys-
tem of self-help, the Fashion Originators’ Guild of America.231  The 
Guild achieved great success in policing the designs of its constituents 
by threatening a group boycott against any retailer that sold copied 
fashion designs.232  One commentator argues that the Guild’s private 
intellectual property rights regime was consistent with and responsible 
for driving innovation in the fashion industry during that time.233  But 
the Guild’s success was short lived; the Supreme Court found that the 
Guild violated antitrust laws by restricting competition.234   
I would argue that, under special circumstances, a modern guild 
can incentivize fast-fashion firms to redesign original creations and 
shift the fashion industry toward the same outcome that the IDPPPA 
would achieve.  I assume that fast-fashion firms and fashion designers 
are engaged in repeated interactions and that there is no legal protec-
tion for fashion designs similar to the scenario shown in Section IV.A.  
If a fast-fashion firm copies a design exactly, a fashion designer could 
 
229 See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 12, at 1715 (“Unlike the music and motion 
picture industries, the fashion industry has not embarked on any substantial anti-piracy 
initiative.”). 
230 See Nicholas Schmidle, Inside the Knockoff Factory, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2010, § 6 
(Magazine), at 38 (providing an account of how some firms have hired international 
private investigators to combat counterfeiting and intellectual property infringement).   
231 See Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules:  Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1363-66 (1996) (explaining how in 
the 1930s manufacturers of women’s dresses formed a guild that encouraged originality, 
eliminated copied items, and thereby “obviated the need for formal property rights”); 
Scafidi, supra note 5, at 119-20 (detailing the development of the Guild in 1932). 
232 See Scafidi, supra note 5, at 119.  
233 See Randal C. Picker, Of Pirates and Puffy Shirts:  A Comment on “The Piracy Paradox:  
Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design” 3 ( John M. Olin Law & Econ. Work-
ing Paper No. 328 (2d Series), 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/=959727 (suggesting 
that contemporaneous observers of the Guild understood that antipiracy measures 
caused manufacturers to shift production from copying to original design (citing Dress 
War, TIME (Mar. 23, 1936), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171, 
930861,00.html)); see also Hemphill & Suk, supra note 1, at 1194 (“Moreover, contem-
poraneous observers understood that the prohibition of piracy caused manufacturers 
to shift production from copying to original design.” (footnote ommitted)). 
234 Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941).   
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join an industry guild rather than bringing a lawsuit.  To join a guild, a 
fashion designer would pay membership dues, the price of which 
would depend on the number of members.  Assuming that a modern 
guild would be as popular as the Fashion Originators’ Guild in the 
1930s, these dues would be de minimis because the guild’s operating 
costs would be spread across a large membership.  The industry guild 
would police the duplication of designers’ works, undertake publicity 
campaigns to denounce the practice of blatant exact copying, and tar-
get the fast-fashion firms responsible for the duplication.  While the 
benefit of these initiatives may not materialize at the first instance, 
repeat offenders who try to copy designs belonging to members of 
the guild would over time suffer reputational harm due to the anti-
copying initiatives and advertisements the guild would launch.  As a 
result of this reputational harm, fast-fashion firms that make exact cop-
ies of original designs would gain less from the practice since the pub-
lic’s perception would have shifted.  If the guild were sufficiently 
influential, the fast-fashion firm would be forced to target another de-
signer not protected by the guild or to simply redesign and innovate.  
Assuming more and more fashion designers join this industry guild 
and it reaches a critical mass, fast-fashion firms would no longer be 
able to engage in exact copying.   
The IDPPPA achieves precisely this result.  A couple of conditions 
must be met for such a guild to be effective.  First, the industry must 
solicit enough fashion designers to commit to a stable guild in order to 
sufficiently lower the guild’s costs.  Second, the guild must ensure that 
its policing efforts remain within the bounds of the law and are suffi-
ciently detrimental to a fast-fashion firm to cause it to commit to rede-
signing or independent innovation.  How a modern guild can go 
about meeting these conditions merits separate investigation, but it is 
clear that the fashion industry can exercise self-help, which may prove 
as effective as legislation.  Passing the IDPPPA obviates the need for 
the fashion industry to undertake private enforcement and launch an 
offensive against copying.  If the IDPPPA does not pass, it will be inter-
esting to observe whether industry groups such as the CFDA will grow 
and develop into private enforcement authorities, paralleling mecha-
nisms that already exist in the music and film industries.  
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2.  Reputation 
Another way to induce Copier to choose Redesign over Exact Copy 
is for Designer to develop a reputation for being “aggressive.”235  This 
means that rather than behaving rationally and objectively evaluating 
payoffs in the games described in Part IV, Designer derives utility from 
choosing Enforce and pursuing litigation to the end.  Designer expe-
riences disutility from not doing so, as failing to litigate would consti-
tute a loss of face.  This reputation for being aggressive will result in 
different payoffs to Designer in a game.  Consider the following game:   
 
Figure 5:  Uncertain Legal Protection—Aggressive Designer 
Figure 5 is similar to Figure 3.2, where I assumed uncertain legal 
protection, but is different in two key respects.  First, Copier does not 
have the opportunity to act after Designer chooses Enforce.  Designer 
will not entertain the prospect of settling and will see litigation to the 
end.  The result of the lawsuit will again depend on whether the out-
come defined by p is Favorable to Copier or Unfavorable to Copier.  
Second, Designer enjoys an incremental gain of 10 when it chooses 
Enforce and an incremental loss of 10 when it chooses Not Enforce.236  
 
235 See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 133, at 178-86 (providing a model for reputation, 
where certain players are aggressive in that they “suffer a loss of face if they fail to carry 
out a threat and the profits they would earn from accommodating are not enough to 
make up for it”).     
236 When Copier chooses Exact Copy and Designer chooses Not Enforce, Copier 
gains 100 while Designer loses 10 in “face” in addition to the standard loss of 100.  See 
supra Figure 5, Box A.  When Copier chooses Exact Copy and Designer chooses En-
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These incremental gains and losses reflect Designer’s aggressive na-
ture and the utility it derives from pursuing litigation.   
Regardless of the value of p, it is clear that when Copier chooses 
Exact Copy, an aggressive Designer will prefer Enforce due to the utili-
ty it derives from pursuing litigation.237  Similarly, when Copier chooses 
Redesign, an aggressive Designer will now always choose Enforce.  
Copier must choose between Exact Copy and Redesign, and depend-
ing on the value of p, it is possible that even under this regime, with 
uncertain legal protection, Copier will prefer Redesign.238  Specifically, 
as long as p is less than 59%, Copier will always choose Redesign.239  By 
virtue of the payoffs that an aggressive Designer experiences, the out-
come under a regime with uncertain legal protection for fashion de-
signs is entirely different and better.   
However, certain circumstances must exist for Designer to success-
fully acquire a reputation for being aggressive.  First, reputation is 
most relevant in a repeated setting against the same player or in a re-
peated setting against different players who are able to observe the 
games played with others.240  That is, a reputation is not useful to De-
signer unless it can be used against Copiers in the industry to deter 
them from choosing Exact Copy.  Second, Designer must commit to its 
reputation for being aggressive.  The reasoning here is similar for 
achieving cooperation among repeat players in the prisoner’s dilem-
ma.241  Just as each criminal in the prisoner’s dilemma will not confess 
 
force, there are two possible outcomes.  If the outcome is Favorable to Copier, Copier 
gains 100 and pays litigation costs of 10, while Designer suffers a loss of 100 and pays 
litigation costs of 10, but gains 10 in utility from pursuing the litigation. See supra Figure 
5, Box B.  If the outcome is Unfavorable to Copier, Copier pays 20 for its own and De-
signer’s litigation costs and disgorges its gains from copying, while Designer suffers no 
loss and gains 10 in utility.  See supra Figure 5, Box C.  When Copier chooses Redesign 
and Designer chooses Not Enforce, Copier enjoys a gain of 50 at no expense to Designer, 
but Designer suffers 10 in loss of face.  See supra Figure 5, Box D.  When Designer in-
stead chooses Enforce, Copier enjoys a gain of 50 and pays litigation costs of 5.  Designer 
pays 5 in litigation costs and though it does not win the lawsuit, it gains 10 in utility from 
pursuing litigation.  Designer nets a positive payoff of 5.  See supra Figure 5, Box E.   
237 I reach this conclusion by examining Designer’s choice if Copier chooses Exact 
Copy.  Compare supra Figure 5, Box A, with supra Figure 5, Box B/C.  Designer will  
prefer Enforce whenever 10 – 110p > -110, which is the case for all values of p, where 
 0 < p < 1.   
238 Compare supra Figure 5, Box B/C, with supra Figure 5, Box D. 
239 Copier will choose Redesign when 45 > -20 + 110p, which means when p < 65/110, 
or p < 59%.  Compare supra Figure 5, Box B/C, with supra Figure 5, Box E.   
240 DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 135, at 310.   
241 See supra notes 141-42.   
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only if the other does the same,242 Copier will only keep choosing Re-
design if Designer lives up to its reputation by consistently choosing 
Enforce.  Once Designer decides to Not Enforce in one interaction, 
Copier and all other Copiers in the industry will have reason to believe 
that Designer is no longer aggressive and will update their strategies 
for the next game to reflect the fact that Designer is rational.   
CONCLUSION 
Congress has not yet extended new protection to fashion designers 
in the United States.  However, the American fashion industry now 
occupies a precarious position, because the duplication of fashion de-
signs has been occurring at an unprecedented pace across global mar-
kets.  The industry has spoken out and expressed great concern.  
Whether the IDPPPA will progress further in Congress cannot be pre-
dicted, but it is certain that fashion designers are suffering as a result 
of a gaping hole in American intellectual property law.  This gap is an 
embarrassment in comparison with the regimes of France, the United 
Kingdom, and the European Union.    
This Comment enters the debate and suggests a new tool, game 
theory, to evaluate the IDPPPA and its potential policy implications.  
Based on simple economic assumptions, basic empirical evidence, and 
intuitions about the incentives and decisions of fashion designers and 
fast-fashion copiers, I constructed a game theory model that explains 
the recent, widely publicized litigation over the duplication of fashion 
designs.  The model predicts that these suits will persist, as fashion de-
signers struggle to extract as much recovery as possible through set-
tlement.  While there is still innovation taking place within the fashion 
industry, it is not maximized by the current legal regime of uncertain-
ty.  In agreement with Professors Hemphill and Suk, the model sug-
gests more innovation is possible and that it can be derived from 
incentivizing fast-fashion copiers to steer clear of exact copying, and 
instead to redesign and reinterpret original works.  In effect, the fast-
fashion copiers are encouraged to become secondary designers, who 
follow closely in time behind the primary designers.      
The IDPPPA is one means to achieve this optimal state of innova-
tion and thus, Congress should pass it.  The IDPPPA bears a resem-
blance to the European Union’s Community design right, which was 
enacted recently and could, with the passage of time, provide a 
 
242 See supra Part III. 
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glimpse into the IDPPPA’s future successes and failures.  At the same 
time, it bears emphasis that the IDPPPA, whether it passes or not, is 
only one means to achieving the ends of maximizing innovation and 
protecting original fashion designs.  It is important to look at alterna-
tives such as the formation of a fashion guild and reputation mecha-
nisms, which, under certain circumstances, could stimulate innovation 
and move the fashion industry toward a more optimal state.     
 
